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BRINGING FORMAL BUSINESS LAWS TO 
CAMEROON’S INFORMAL SECTOR:  
LESSONS AND CAUTIONS FROM  
THE TAX LAW EXAMPLE 
CLAIRE MOORE DICKERSON

 
ABSTRACT 
A substantial majority of non-agricultural workers in a developing 
country such as Cameroon engage in legal businesses below the 
governmental radar, that is, in the informal sector. Because that segment 
of the Sub-Saharan economy is critical to subsistence within the region, 
and because the financial crisis has expanded the informal sector in the 
Global North, developing economies’ experience with the informal sector 
is of world-wide relevance.  
Formal business laws do exist in the formal sector; however, trying to 
move informal-sector workers to the formal sector where these laws 
already offer some protection can disrupt the entrepreneurs’ ability to 
sustain themselves, and to contribute to the national economy. A pilot 
study in five Cameroonian markets is thus of general interest when it 
reveals that entrepreneurs there do not benefit from formal business laws, 
which in turn limits their ability to borrow and their willingness to lend. 
The same study also suggests that tax literature has interesting, non-
coercive strategies to improve tax compliance in ways that may be 
applicable to facilitating the introduction of formal business laws to the 
informal sector, instead of forcing informal-sector workers into the formal 
sector. The tax-morale literature recommends deploying strategies of 
reciprocity, in addition to providing public goods and services—strategies 
that encourage compliance—instead of using governmental power to 
extract tax payments. Similarly, tax-based strategies can apply to business 
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laws while informal-sector workers remain in the informal sector, even 
though the government’s posture vis-à-vis commercial actors is less direct 
than vis-à-vis taxpayers. 
The experience of Cameroon’s informal sector with formal tax law thus 
provides important insights on steps within the government’s control that 
would not only improve tax compliance, but would also bring formal 
business laws and their transaction-cost-reducing potential to the informal 
sector. The pro-business strategy is to apply tax-morale learning, which 
calls for government authorities to enter into a reciprocal relationship—
respectful and communicative—with private parties and to focus on 
investing in basic infrastructure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Sub-Saharan Africa generally, and Cameroon in particular, formal 
business laws exist. For the relationship between a supplier of goods and a 
retail seller, the “OHADA Uniform Acts”1 are the business laws 
applicable in Cameroon and sixteen other West and Central African 
countries. For the relationship between a retail seller and a consumer, 
Cameroon’s domestic consumer and contract laws apply.2 A pilot study of 
twenty entrepreneurs in five markets of Cameroon, conducted in late 2010 
with the University of Buea’s Dr. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo, is uniform in 
showing that these formal laws do not have a significant impact on 
entrepreneurs in the recesses of Cameroon’s economy.3 
 
 
 1. “OHADA” stands for l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique 
(as usually translated into English, the “Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in 
Africa”). See generally Traité relatif à l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique, Oct. 17, 
1993, last revised Oct. 17, 2008, 4 Journal Officiel de l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit 
des Affaires en Afrique [J.O. OHADA] 1 [hereinafter OHADA Treaty], available at 
http://www.ohada.org/traites-et-conventions.html. 
 2. See generally infra Part I.B.1. 
 3. On file with author. 
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As we will see, these recesses are in the informal sector,
4
 which is a 
significant portion of the Sub-Saharan economy. Indeed, it is the business 
home of the vast majority of non-agricultural workers, and it is an 
important means of survival. The entrepreneurs targeted here by the study 
are workers who operated in the informal sector of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
that is, the people who work largely under the governmental radar. They 
were selling everything from shoes, to durables, to produce.  
Various business-law scholars, such as Stuart Macaulay, Lisa 
Bernstein, and Donald Langevoort have underscored the effectiveness of 
extralegal controls over business, in particular where the parties are in an 
iterative relationship. In the Global North—that is, in the developed 
world—those extralegal controls exist within a construct of formal 
business laws: even if these laws are never used by members of a tightly 
knit group, they cast a shadow of predictability. This shadow, the pilot 
study suggests, does not exist in Cameroon’s informal-sector niches under 
study here. This is particularly important, because the study further 
indicates that there is less repeat business in the studied markets than I had 
expected: many are described as one-off, arm’s length transactions.5 In 
turn, this means that businesspeople in an important part of the local 
economy cannot benefit from the transaction-cost-reducing effects of 
extra-legal constraints or of law-induced predictability. The consequences 
are as expected: because of the very limited extension of credit, an 
entrepreneur’s ability to raise capital on the one hand, and to extend the 
market to new buyers on the other, is reduced. Each of these effects will be 
examined in turn, with a focus on enhancing the shadow cast by the formal 
laws. 
Despite this apparently limited impact of formal business law in 
Cameroon’s informal sector, the country’s formal tax law, at least at first 
blush, does appear to have a direct impact on the informal sector. 
Cameroon’s tax code is sophisticated, and even the study’s interviewees, 
untouched by formal business laws, reported paying at least some tax 
imposed by the formal tax law. This Article argues that the success of 
formal tax is at best superficial and does not reflect actual compliance with 
formal tax laws. The formidable literature on tax compliance, however, 
explains why taxpayers tend to pay more than would a wholly rational 
homo economicus.  This scholarship thus provides, in the arena of business 
 
 
 4. More fully discussed infra Part I.A. 
 5. See STÉPHANIE KWEMO, L’OHADA ET LE SECTEUR INFORMEL : L’EXEMPLE DU CAMEROUN 
170 (2012)  (Belg.)  (making the same observation). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] FORMAL BUSINESS LAWS IN CAMEROON’S INFORMAL SECTOR 269 
 
 
 
 
laws, directly applicable guidance to a government that wishes to enhance 
the success of entrepreneurs in its informal sector.  
The World Bank, among others, has sought to enhance and implement 
business laws in the region. Once national governments have modernized 
the formal business laws, the World Bank and other donors have worked 
with the governments to help apply these laws-on-the-books (the formal 
laws) by focusing on improving the enforcement procedures of the judicial 
branch. A complementary goal has been to bring more entrepreneurs into 
that part of the economy where the government is able to apply formal 
business laws relatively predictably and effectively. In effect, the goal is to 
“beef up” the formal sector and to move entrepreneurs from the informal 
economy to the formal sector. As an example, the International Finance 
Corporation supported a project to simplify the OHADA laws’ legally 
mandated filings imposed even on very small commercial operators. 
Nevertheless, the requirements remain quite complex and, in the event of 
continued non-filing, the loss of rights remains significant.
6
 The revision 
thus wields a stick to urge more informal-sector entrepreneurs to acquire 
the registered, formal status.
7
 
This Article focuses on the opposite. The workers in the informal 
sector are hardworking and effective under what often are harsh 
circumstances and the entire Sub-Saharan economy and countless families 
depend on these entrepreneurs’ continuing success, year after year, despite 
the difficult commercial environment. Instead of bringing informal-sector 
entrepreneurs to the formal business laws, it could be less disruptive, and 
thus less dangerous to people and economies already at risk, to bring the 
formal business laws to the informal-sector workers. The focus should 
thus be on bringing the transaction-cost-reducing benefits of formal 
business law to informal-sector entrepreneurs even before they formalize 
their status. 
This Article explores the possible interplay of formal tax laws and 
formal business laws by studying the government’s apparent success in 
 
 
 6. See infra Part III.C (discussing the use of a less favorable statute of limitations period for 
certain commercial operators who have failed to comply with the filing requirements of the OHADA 
statute relating to certain commercial acts). Given Part I.B’s evidence that formal business laws do not, 
as a practical matter, penetrate into the informal commercial environments, this effort to punish non-
compliance may not matter. 
 7. See, e.g., Lionel Yondo Black, Les enjeux de la réforme : une volonté de favoriser la création 
d’entreprises, les échanges commerciaux et la confiance dans la zone OHADA, 201 DROIT ET 
PATRIMOINE 42, 44 (Mar. 2011) (Fr.) (“The OHADA legislature sought to adopt provisions that would 
ease the passage of commercial operators from the informal sector to the formal sector,” translated 
from “[L]e législateur communautaire a notamment souhaité adopter des dispositions facilitant le 
passage des opérateurs du secteur informel au secteur formel . . . .”). 
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collecting taxes. On close inspection, it is a cautionary tale, not to be 
emulated as it does not depend on compliance with formal law—formal 
tax law in this case. Nevertheless, techniques to improve both the 
government’s and taxpayers’ tax compliance also offer an alternate 
strategy for inserting business laws into those informal commercial 
environments where it does not currently function. This conclusion is 
somewhat counterintuitive, because the posture of government in tax law 
is very different from its posture in business law. In tax law, the 
government is the party directly opposite the taxpayer; in business law, the 
classic template has only the private parties opposite each other, with the 
government as part of the backdrop. Nevertheless, the pilot study suggests 
that the same governmental strategies that increase tax compliance, 
including a government that takes the stance of respectful reciprocity and 
communicates effectively its contributions to its populace, will increase 
businesspeople’s willingness to learn about and comply with formal laws. 
In the context of business, this would bring formal business laws’ 
transaction-cost-reducing predictability to the informal sector, instead of 
wrenching creative and hard-working entrepreneurs out of an already 
difficult but familiar environment into a new and differently harsh 
environment. Because the current financial crisis has expanded the 
informal sectors of formerly developed countries, Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
experience with formal laws in the informal sector is relevant well beyond 
that part of the world. 
Part I describes the informal sector and who the pilot-project 
participants are, and how formal business laws fail to provide informal-
sector entrepreneurs the benefits of those laws. Part II opens with a 
discussion of formal tax laws and describes how tax collection actually 
occurs. Using information provided by the project’s interviewees, this 
Article underscores that tax collection in the informal sector is an exercise 
of government power over vulnerable constituents. Indeed, the fact of tax 
collection is not proof that either the government or the taxpayers actually 
respect the formal tax laws. The existing tax regime is based on 
governmental coercion; this Article rejects extending this practice of 
coercion to imposing on informal-sector entrepreneurs the systematic 
adoption of formal business laws. Part III discusses strategies that 
demonstrably increase voluntary compliance with formal tax laws, and 
then considers how to translate these concepts to the application of formal 
business laws in the informal sector. Using evidence from the tax context 
as a laboratory, this Part then acknowledges that the translation of tax-
morale concepts into the business context is complicated by the very 
different roles of government in the tax and business arenas. It also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/6
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explains how a tax-compliance strategy applied to formal business laws 
encourages the government to focus on communication with informal-
sector entrepreneurs and on the development of at least embryonic 
structures designed to reinforce the formal judicial system. The same 
actions that would improve the tax regime would also enhance the 
likelihood of formal business laws entering the informal sector, and of 
gaining traction with informal-sector entrepreneurs. 
I. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF BUSINESS LAWS IS UNAVAILABLE TO THE 
INFORMAL SECTOR 
After describing more fully the informal sector and the study 
participants, this Part focuses on the formal business laws that are 
technically applicable to the participants, and on the participants’ 
descriptions of their own business practices. These practices reveal no 
practical impact from formal business laws.  
A. The Context 
1. The Informal Sector, Defined 
The informal sector is important to Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of this 
region’s economy, including that of the seventeen OHADA member-
states,
8
 is part of the informal sector. The informal sector produces 30% of 
worldwide GDP,
9
 and conservatively between 40% and 60% of the Sub-
Saharan economy.
10
 In Cameroon, it is estimated that the informal sector 
generated approximately 42% of GDP in 1995–96.11 Further, the Sub-
 
 
 8. The members of OHADA are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. All are Francophone except for 
Cameroon (English and French), Equatorial Guinea (Spanish and French), and Guinea-Bissau 
(Portuguese). 
 9. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, 1 MAKING THE 
LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE 15 (2008), available at http://der.oas.org/Institutional_relations/Final 
%20Report_English.pdf. 
 10. See Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and 
Consequences, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 77, 78–79 (2000) [hereinafter Schneider & Enste 2000] (describing 
“shadow economy” as unregistered); FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER & DOMINIK H. ENSTE, THE SHADOW 
ECONOMY: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (2002). See generally ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC 
PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 13–16 (2007) (discussing the definition of the “shadow economy” 
and using, inter alia, the Schneider analysis based on GDP). 
 11. ILO, WOMEN AND MEN IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: A STATISTICAL PICTURE 19 (2002), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/infoecon/docs/441/F596332090/women%20and%20men%20stat 
%20picture.pdf. 
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Saharan informal sector employs between 51% (South Africa) and 93% 
(OHADA-member Benin) of all non-agricultural workers.
12
 In the urban 
settings of Cameroon, such as that of the markets where the interviewees 
were located, the figure was estimated at 70% in 2010.
13
 
The informal sector is sometimes defined as the part of a national 
economy that is not represented in the GDP.
14
 Although informal-sector 
activity is not necessarily illegal, this definition includes tax evasion, as 
well as the operation of illegal businesses.
15
 Overall, it appears that the 
references to “tax evasion” in this context refer to evasion of income or 
value added taxes. For example, while Friedrich Schneider defines what he 
calls the “shadow economy” as including activity “deliberately concealed 
from public authorities . . . to avoid payment of income, value added or 
other taxes,”16 a good portion of the interior references relate to the taxes 
typically salient in the Global North, namely those income and value 
added taxes.
17
 As described below in Part I.A.2, the twenty participants in 
the pilot study did pay taxes, but their businesses were too small to owe 
income or value added taxes.
18
  
 
 
 12. Id. In 2012, in Cameroon, 52.7% of the population was estimated to live in urban areas. U.N. 
Statistics Div., Cameroon, UN DATA, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=CAMEROON 
(last updated 2013). 
 13. WORLD BANK, CAMEROON COUNTRY OFFICE, UNLOCKING THE LABOR FORCE: AN 
ECONOMIC UPDATE ON CAMEROON WITH A FOCUS ON EMPLOYMENT, CAMEROON ECONOMIC UPDATE 
17 (2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMEROON/Resources/CMR_ 
Economic_update.January.2012.pdf. 
 14. See Friedrich Schneider, The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) 
Know?, (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6423, 2012) (Ger.) [hereinafter Schneider, 
Work], available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp6423.pdf. But see KWEMO, supra note 5, at 99 (describing the 
usual operational definition of Cameroon’s informal sector as depending on non-registration plus lack 
of written accounts). The latter definition makes sense when the goal is to assess the effectiveness of 
provisions in the formal law; the former definition is more generally applied. See, e.g., Richard M. 
Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in 
Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1645 (2005) (referring to Friedrich Schneider’s 
analysis). See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and 
Formal Law: A Functional Understanding of Business Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 185 (2011) 
(discussing different definitions of the informal sector, including Friedrich Schneider’s) [hereinafter 
Dickerson, Entrepreneurs]. 
 15. See, e.g., Schneider & Enste 2000, supra note 10, at 79 (referring, inter alia, to tax evasion, 
the drug trade, prostitution, and gambling, as well as unreported legal activities); Schneider, Work, 
supra note 14, at 4–6. 
 16. Schneider, Work, supra note 14, at 6. 
 17. See, e.g., KIRCHLER, supra note 10, at 34, 46 (referring to marginal rates and income 
declaration). 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
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The economic and legal literature defining the informal sector tends to 
concern businesses that are larger and better-established.
19
 Every one of 
our twenty pilot-project interviewees described perfectly legal commercial 
enterprises, and while they did not obtain business licenses, they were 
generally not required to do so.
20
 Importantly, they reported paying, or 
even overpaying, most of the formal taxes due.  
Thus, the interviewees appeared to have conformed substantially to 
their legal obligations vis-à-vis the government. For purposes of this 
Article, the businesses are nevertheless deemed to be in the informal 
sector, in part because they are so modest and precarious that they are hard 
for the government to trace and, given the endemically haphazard record-
keeping, may or may not have had their activities included in the GDP. 
The definition of the informal sector is complicated by the permeable 
nature of its border with the formal sector. Many workers in the formal 
sector also work in the informal sector. For example, a fully licensed 
restaurant owner may operate a dress-and-accessories shop out of a back 
room. A hairdresser may have an official shop, but also cut and style hair 
from home or go to clients’ homes. A dress-shop owner may well have a 
second, unofficial location at home. Indeed, a tailor who works 
exclusively in a particular shop may still have a part of the business in the 
informal sector. Because the border is so porous, it is difficult to identify 
which activities are in that sector. Nevertheless, the small size of the 
interviewees’ businesses and the relatively mechanical types of taxes they 
paid together increased their ability to fly under the government’s 
information-gathering radar.  This helps characterize them as informal-
sector entrepreneurs. 
2. Pilot-Study Participants 
With Dr. Yenshu’s advice and assistance, and with the help of other 
colleagues and of graduate students at the University of Buea,
21
 I 
 
 
 19. WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS IN A MORE TRANSPARENT WORLD 16 (2012) 
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012] (discussing its methodology, including that data 
are limited to the formal sector), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing% 
20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB12-FullReport.pdf. 
 20. See General Tax Code, § C.11(15) (Cameroon) (“persons liable to the discharge tax”) 
[hereinafter Gen. Tax Code], available at http://www.impots.cm/uploads/pdf/code/cgi2010/ 
CGI%202010,%20version%20anglaise.pdf. See infra Part II.A.1, assuming that at least most of the 
interviewees are subject to the discharge tax. Gen. Tax Code, § C.47(12) (a taxpayer with annual sales 
in excess of fifteen million FCFA is subject to the business license, not the discharge tax). 
 21. See supra note . The markets selected included the most sophisticated informal-sector 
market in Cameroon’s commercial capital, plus a more local but still sophisticated market in that same 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conducted a pilot study in the fall of 2010. The study consisted of twenty 
interviews with vendors in, or at the very edge of, five markets in 
Cameroon. Of these twenty vendors, seven sold produce. Ten other 
vendors sold non-perishable goods. The remaining three were service 
providers: a tailor, a hairdresser, and a restaurant owner. The vendors 
interviewed all purchased from suppliers for the purpose of reselling 
goods; even the service providers sold substantial amounts of goods in 
their businesses. The vendors sold to some purchasers who resold at retail, 
but most purchasers bought for their own use and thus were, by definition, 
consumers.
22
 All the interviewees were knowledgeable about their 
business niches and were operating in a very difficult, unforgiving 
business environment. 
The following six vendors had fully enclosed stores of various levels of 
sophistication: the hairdresser, restaurant owner, tailor, and three sellers of 
clothing. Among the sellers of produce, two sold through so-called 
“groceries” that were essentially lean-tos, while the five other produce-
vendors sold from tables or from a canvas spread on the ground. The 
vendors of clothes or shoes sold “seconds” shipped from the developed 
world and resold in the markets as so-called “second-hand goods.”23 For 
the most part, these vendors operated from an étagère (sometimes referred 
to as a “stand” in English), not even a lean-to. Most of the interviewees, 
even those in the heart of the markets, rented their premises from private 
landlords. Five of the twenty vendors rented their business premises from 
the local government (the “Council”).24  
Within the informal sector, entrepreneurs varied in size and 
sophistication. Our interviewees were essentially exclusively in the 
informal sector and included persons who appeared, based on the size of 
their inventory and the location and aspect of their place of sale, to be 
financially vulnerable. Their engagement in trade preserved them from full 
 
 
city. The other markets were all in the purely Anglophone region; one was in a regional commercial 
center; while two others were smaller. The interviewees were selected through accidental sampling, 
plus, especially in the most sophisticated market of the commercial capital, and in the relatively 
sophisticated market within the Anglophone region, some snowball sampling, where one interviewee 
recommended another—or where another vendor insisted on being interviewed. 
 22. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 23. Friperies in French; the sellers of these goods were in a market in the port city of Douala, 
also Cameroon’s commercial capital. 
 24. Twelve rented from private individuals; of the remaining three, one had no fixed place of 
business in Cameroon, and the other two were unclear as to whether they rented from the Council or a 
private person. The rental arrangements are the subject of a separate study; although the boundaries are 
difficult to maintain, for the current Article the focus is on the sales transactions and consequences 
directly related to them. 
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unemployment and at minimum allowed them to contribute to the family’s 
income, including for the children’s school fees. These entrepreneurs 
included people with little education, but also, by way of example, a 
woman with a university degree in agronomy who was selling produce 
from a canvas spread on the ground, and a man with a university degree in 
transport logistics who sold second-hand goods from a lean-to stall.
25
 
B. In Cameroon’s Informal Sector, Formal Business Laws Do Not Apply 
Reliably 
Formal business laws are important. They do exist in Cameroon, but 
they are not in evidence in the informal sector, let alone predictably 
enforced there. To remedy this void, the first step is to assess the business-
law reality in the informal sector before considering how to rectify any 
lapse. 
Businesses in the Global North benefit from predictably enforced, 
traditional business laws such as contracts, business organizations, and 
commercial law, including secured transactions. These reduce transaction 
costs by providing a framework for agreements and a structure for 
relatively reliable enforcement. However, businesses also benefit from 
other laws not generally considered under the rubric of “business laws.” 
These include real property law, employment and labor law, and insurance 
law. Personal security is critical, too; thus laws that organize an 
appropriately constrained police force and protect the rights of citizens 
against abuse also support business.
26
  
When considering how to provide the benefits of formal business law 
to informal-sector entrepreneurs, we will ask in Part II below whether the 
experience of formal tax law is a good template. In order to focus the 
discussion, this current subpart will first sketch out the formal, classic 
business laws technically applicable to extension of credit and repayment 
of debt in Cameroon, including its informal sector, and then describe how 
our interviewees actually acquired their supplies and how they actually 
sold them to their customers.  
 
 
 25. Again, in French, friperies; despite the English term, these products often are previously 
unworn, but are recycled from the developed world because of irregularities or changes in fashion. 
 26. See Dickerson, Entrepreneurs, supra note 14, at 187–89 (describing formal laws other than 
classic business laws, and other even non-legal institutions, that support business in the Global North). 
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1. Formal Business Laws Technically Applicable in Cameroon 
The formal business laws in Cameroon, which for purposes of this 
discussion are limited to the laws governing an interviewee’s purchase of 
goods from a supplier and the interviewee’s resale to a customer, do 
technically and officially cover transactions within the informal sector.
27
 
The discussion starts with OHADA because one of its laws applies to 
transactions between the supplier and the retail seller. The OHADA Treaty 
has created a series of institutions, including principally a Council of 
Heads of State and of Government, a Council of Ministers (legislature), a 
Permanent Secretariat (executive), a supranational Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration, and a center for training legal professionals in 
OHADA laws (ERSUMA).
28
 Pursuant to that treaty, the institutions have 
adopted and are helping to implement nine business laws that already 
provide substantial coverage of business transactions and relationships.
29
 
These laws are called “Uniform Acts” because, once adopted according to 
the procedures set out in the OHADA Treaty, the laws automatically and 
without modification become part of the internal domestic law of each of 
the OHADA member states, including Cameroon.
30
 Furthermore, these 
Uniform Acts preempt and supersede any existing or future laws on the 
 
 
 27. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Promises of Future Performance and Informal-Sector 
Transfers of Personal Property: The Example of Anglophone Cameroon, 2011 ACTA JURIDICA 285, 
288–94 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Dickerson, Future Performance] (discussing formal laws applicable to 
consumer-retail seller, and supplier-retail seller transactions in Anglophone Cameroon). 
 28. OHADA Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 27–41 (describing OHADA institutions). See generally 
Mohammed Baba Idris, Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa—An Insight into the Laws, Issues, 
Problems and Prospects, in UNIFIED BUSINESS LAWS FOR AFRICA: COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES ON 
OHADA 29, 35–37 (Claire Moore Dickerson ed., 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter UNIFIED BUSINESS LAWS 
FOR AFRICA] (discussing the OHADA institutions). 
 29. Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d’Intérêt 
Economique, art. 908, Apr. 17, 1997, 2 J.O. OHADA 1, revision adopted Jan. 30, 2014, J.O. OHADA 
1 (Special Edition, Feb. 4, 2014); Acte Uniforme portant sur le Droit Commercial Général, Apr. 17, 
1997, 1 J.O. OHADA 1, revision adopted Dec. 15, 2010, 23 J.O. OHADA 1 [hereinafter GCL (the 
acronym for the usual translation, “General Commercial Law”)]; Acte Uniforme portant Organisation 
des Sûretés, Apr. 17, 1997, 3 J.O. OHADA 1, revision adopted Dec. 15, 2010, 22 J.O. OHADA 1; 
Acte Uniforme portant Organisation des Procédures Simplifées de Recouvrement et des Voies 
d’Exécution, Apr. 10, 1998, 6 J.O. OHADA 1; Acte Uniforme portant Organisation des Procédures 
Collectives d’Apurement du Passif, Apr. 10, 1998, 7 J.O. OHADA 1; Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit 
de l’Arbitrage, Mar. 11, 1999, 8 J.O. OHADA 1; Acte Uniforme portant Organisation et 
Harmonisation des Compatibilités des Entreprises, Feb. 22, 2000, 10 J.O. OHADA 1 [hereinafter UA 
Accounting]; Acte Uniforme relatif aux Contrats de Transport de Marchandises par Route, Mar. 22, 
2003, 13 J.O. OHADA 3; Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Coopératives, Dec. 15, 2010, 23 
J.O. OHADA 1. 
 30. OHADA Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10 (referring to the supremacy of the Uniform Acts). 
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same subject throughout all member states.
31
 The laws are enforced 
through the national judicial regimes, except when the cause of action 
would be appealed to the national supreme court. When a cause of action 
applying OHADA laws would otherwise be appealed to Cameroon’s 
Supreme Court, it is instead appealed to OHADA’s Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration,
32
 located in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. 
One of the Uniform Acts, commonly referred to as the General 
Commercial Law (“GCL”),33 covers contracts relating to transactions 
between the suppliers and the interviewees, since the latter are not 
purchasing for their own consumption.
34
 The GCL was amended in 2011, 
after the interviews occurred. The discussion below uses the numbering of 
the revised text with the former numbering in parentheses. It also indicates 
how the application of the new text differs from that of the former text.
35
  
By its terms, the GCL controls transactions between commerçants.
36
 It 
almost certainly controls, as well, transactions between entreprenants,
37
 a 
new category introduced by the 2011 revisions and aimed at smaller 
entrepreneurs.
38
 Thus it also controls relationships between commerçants 
and entreprenants. Because “entreprenant” is a neologism, the English 
translation sometimes used is “enterpriser.” The retail sellers and at least 
some of the suppliers are probably enterprisers; alternatively, they are 
commerçants, sometimes translated as “economic operators.” An 
economic operator is required to register with the government,
39
 while an 
enterpriser must file a declaration.
40
 While the text is somewhat opaque, it 
appears that a person who meets the “enterpriser” criteria but does not file 
a declaration resolves back into an “economic operator” even though the 
 
 
 31. Id. Uniformity of interpretation is protected by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, 
to which is appealed any litigation that would otherwise have been appealed to the national supreme 
court of a member state. Id. arts. 14–15. 
 32. Id. arts. 13–16. 
 33. See GCL, supra note 29. 
 34. Id. art. 234 (formerly art. 202). 
 35. See generally Dickerson, Future Performance, supra note 27, at 291–94 (discussing the 
GCL’s application to the supplier relationship with the retail seller). 
 36. GCL, supra note 29, art. 234 (former art. 202) et seq. 
 37. Id. arts. 30, 234 (formerly art. 202). 
 38. Id. art. 30 (describing the entreprenant as having a low enough turnover to be within the 
OHADA accounting regime’s category having the most simplified accounting responsibilities). The 
OHADA Uniform Act on Accounting is described supra note 29. The UA Accounting provides that 
the most simplified regime applies to companies whose annual turnover is up to 30 million FCFA (c. 
USD 60,000) for businesses engaged in trade, 20 million FCFA (c. USD 40,000) for artisanal 
businesses, and 10 million FCFA (c. USD 20,000) for service providers. UA Accounting, supra note 
29, art. 30. 
 39. GCL, supra note 29, arts. 35 (formerly art. 19), 13–14 (substantially unchanged). 
 40. Id. art. 30 (new). 
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filings required of an economic operator have not been satisfied.
41
 The 
GCL, a formal business law, by its terms governs sales transactions 
between or amongst economic operators, whether or not registered, and 
whether or not the status as economic operator results from failure to 
declare as an enterpriser.  Thus this law governs the relationship between 
and among the interviewees and their suppliers. For the same reason, the 
GCL applies to sales transactions between the interviewees and those of 
their customers who themselves purchase for resale. 
The GCL requires buyers, including interviewees purchasing from their 
suppliers, to pay the purchase price as the parties have agreed.
42
 The 
contract determines the terms: if it allows the buyer to pay thirty days after 
delivery, with or without a stipulated interest component, that describes 
the interviewee’s obligation.43 
Further, the GCL creates implied warranties imposed on sellers.
44
 
Therefore, even if the interviewees did not borrow from their suppliers and 
thus had no credit obligations, they might have rights against the suppliers. 
If the contract were silent, the quality of the goods must be in conformity 
with samples or models if there were any, and otherwise the goods must 
be as expected in the trade.
45
 
Sales by interviewees to customers for resale were governed by the 
GCL just as were the supplier-to-interviewee sales, except that the 
interviewees became the sellers. Almost all of the interviewees’ sales were 
to consumers purchasing for their own use and not to customers 
purchasing for resale.
46
 In that context, the interviewees remained either 
economic operators or enterprisers, but their customers, being consumers, 
were neither.
47
 Thus, the GCL was not the formal law that applied to the 
vast majority of the interviewees’ sales. Instead, non-OHADA national 
law applied to these transactions. 
Where OHADA law does not apply, Cameroon, being formally bijural 
for historical reasons, has different non-OHADA law depending on the 
 
 
 41. Dickerson, Future Performance, supra note 27, at 288–94 (discussing effect of failure to 
register as economic operators or declare as enterprisers). 
 42. GCL, supra note 29, arts. 262–68 (formerly arts. 234–39) (setting out payment obligations) 
 43. Id. art. 268 (formerly art. 239) (“L’acheteur doit payer le prix à la date convenue et ne peut 
subordonner son paiement à une démarche du vendeur”). 
 44. Id. art. 255 (formerly art. 224) (imposing warranties). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing the participants) and Part I.B.2 (describing how the 
interviewees in fact did business). 
 47. GCL, supra note 29, arts. 2–4 (numbering unchanged) (definition of commerçant, “economic 
operator”), 30 (new) (definition of entreprenant, “enterpriser”). 
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transaction’s geographic location.48 The formal law that did apply to these 
transactions in the regions of Cameroon that had been under British 
colonial rule prior to their 1961 independence was the British common law 
of contracts as applied prior to independence,
49
 except as superseded by 
Cameroon’s post-independence laws and regulations.50 With the same 
caveat about the effect of supervening domestic law in the regions that had 
been under French colonial rule prior to their 1960 independence,
51
 the 
basic formal law applicable to transactions between the retail seller and 
consumer was the law of obligations contained in Cameroon’s Civil 
Code.
52
 
For purposes of sales between the interviewees and consumers, the 
formal law that modified common law or the Civil Code, as appropriate, is 
Cameroon’s consumer law (Cameroon Consumer Law).53 While this 
consumer law has provisions concerning labeling, and a general provision 
obligating the commercial seller to focus on satisfying the consumer 
expectations on price and quality,
54
 the common law and Civil Code 
continued to govern the basic contractual relationship between the parties, 
including recovery in the event that the retail seller has extended credit. 
This combination of Cameroon Consumer Law together with, in the 
Anglophone regions of Cameroon, common law applied to all sales by the 
interviewees to consumers. 
 
 
 48. See Ordinance No. 72/4, Aug. 26, 1972, organizing the judiciary system in Cameroon. See 
also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Jan. 18, 1996, art. 68 (laws of the preceding, 
federated state continue as long as they are not repugnant and not amended). See generally Charles M. 
Fombad, An Experiment in Legal Pluralism: The Cameroonian Bi-Jural/Uni-Jural Imbroglio, 16 U. 
TASMANIA L. REV. 209, 216 (1997) (explaining the limitations of the argument that bijuralism has the 
constitution’s protection through its art. 68). On the other hand, the country undeniably is bilingual. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON art. 1(3). See generally Dickerson, Future 
Performance, supra note 27, at 288 n.7 (discussing Cameroonian bilingualism and bijuralism). 
 49. Jean Alain Penda Matipé, The History of the Harmonization of Laws in Africa, in UNIFIED 
BUSINESS LAWS FOR AFRICA, supra note 28, at 7, 16 (discussing Cameroonian legal history). 
 50. See generally Dickerson, Future Performance, supra note 27, at 289 (discussing pre- and 
post-independence Cameroonian law, other than the GCL, applicable to contracts). 
 51. Penda, supra note 49, at 16 (discussing Cameroon history). 
 52. For an example of the French-influenced Cameroonian domestic law applicable to a 
transaction not governed by the GCL, see Cameroon Civil Code, Title VI “de la vente”, Ch. I “de la 
nature et de la forme de la vente,” Ch. V “des obligations de l’acheteur”, arts. 1582–1657 (containing 
the law of obligations). See also GCL, supra note 29, art. 237 (new) (stating explicitly that commercial 
sales remain subject to domestic law not contrary to the GCL articles on commercial sale). 
 53. Loi 90/031 du 10 août 1990 Régissant l’activité commercial au Cameroun [hereinafter 
Cameroon Consumer Law]. This was the law in effect during the interview, but since that time it has 
been replaced by Loi-Cadre 2011/012 du 6 mai 2011 portant protection du consommateur au 
Cameroun.   
 54. Cameroon Consumer Law, supra note 53, arts. 20–21, 3, respectively. 
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Inevitably, a supplier’s willingness to extend credit to an interviewee 
who was a reseller, and the interviewee’s willingness to extend credit to 
any customer, whether or not a consumer, would depend in part on 
whether the formal law was perceived by the lender to protect a creditor’s 
rights with some reliability. A purchaser’s willingness to buy might 
similarly depend on the effectiveness of warranties, whether contractually 
provided, implied at law, or directly imposed by statute. If the purchaser 
wanted the warranties, the willingness to buy would in turn depend on the 
purchaser’s expectation that the warranties would be respected. No matter 
how elegantly drafted the applicable formal laws were, they would be 
perceived as reliable only if they were predictably enforced. Because the 
GCL, the common law of contracts, the Civil Code, and the Cameroon 
Consumer Law are formal laws, the formal enforcement method was and 
remains through Cameroon’s national judicial system.55 
If no borrowing occurred, there was again no credit-related right or 
obligation on the part of the interviewees or their counterparties. 
Nevertheless, the retail-seller might not only have rights against the 
supplier under an implied warranty of quality, as provided by the GCL, 
but also might have a similar obligation under the Cameroon Consumer 
Law to a purchaser who was a consumer. 
The next subpart considers how the interviewees in fact transacted 
business. If they tended not to receive or extend credit, and if, when they 
did extend credit, they tended not to use the formal courts to enforce 
broken promises, these behaviors cannot prove, but would provide a good 
indication that formal business law was not in fact applied in those 
circumstances. Similarly, buyers’ insistence on warranties concerning 
quality would indicate the viability of the laws creating those rights. For 
its part, buyers’ uniform failure to insist on such rights would not prove 
that the formal laws failed to provide protection; there could be market 
reasons, such as the preference for lower prices, that would induce buyers 
to refuse the benefit of warranties. Nevertheless, buyers’ consistent neglect 
to demand a warranty could provide further indication that they did not 
perceive the laws as reliable.  
 
 
 55. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing how OHADA Uniform Acts, including the GCL, are first 
considered by national courts and pass to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, if at all, only 
upon final appeal). 
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2. How the Participants Conducted Business in the Informal Sector 
Only one of the participants had registered as an economic operator. 
Because, at the time, the option of the “enterpriser” status did not yet exist, 
every seller was technically an economic operator and obligated to register 
as such.
56
 Nevertheless, when the factual criteria of the economic-operator 
status were met, the rights and obligations under the GCL still applied to 
the sellers, including the requirements concerning contracts of commercial 
sale,
57
 as did basic contract law, the Civil Code, and consumer law.
58
 As a 
general matter, the interviewees reported neither benefiting from nor being 
constrained by the provisions of formal business law. In fact, formal 
business law appears to have been irrelevant to the interviewees’ daily 
operations. 
As is typical in business, none of the interviewees produced all the 
items sold.
59
 This was true even for the service providers: the tailor 
acquired cloth from as far as China; the hairdresser purchased hair 
extensions (“meches”)60 and other accessories principally from the main 
commercial town, Douala, ninety minutes away by private car and far 
longer by local jitney; and the restaurateur obtained most of the raw 
material from local markets. A vendor of goods reported going to Dubai, 
Turkey, and Europe to procure supplies, another went to China, and yet 
another traveled to Ghana, Benin, and Mali. The sellers of “second-hand 
goods” purchased their inventory at an informal auction, straight from the 
palettes. Three vendors of produce purchased their goods in a larger 
market in the same South-West Region of Cameroon, or in Douala.
61
 
Two types of issues are particularly salient when considering the 
application of formal laws in a business context, especially concerning 
sales: first, the ability to borrow and the willingness to lend, and second, 
 
 
 56. GCL, supra note 29, arts. 35 (formerly art. 19), 13, 14 (substantially unchanged). See 
generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing formal laws applicable in OHADA countries, including 
Cameroon). 
 57. GCL, supra note 29, art. 234 (formerly art. 202) (describing commercial contracts). See 
generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the obligation to register and the applicability of the GCL 
commercial-sales-contract provisions to transactions between and among any combination of 
economic operators and enterprisers, even absent registration or declaration, as appropriate). 
 58. See generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing common law contract law and the Cameroon 
Consumer Law). 
 59. For further descriptions of the interviewees at work, from different perspectives, see 
generally Dickerson, Entrepreneurs, supra note 14; Dickerson, Future Performance, supra note 27. 
 60. From the French for a lock of hair (la mèche); appears to mean a hair extension in 
Cameroon’s Anglophone regions. 
 61. Douala is in the Littoral Region, not in the Anglophone South-West and North-West 
Regions. 
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the obligation to meet standards of quality specified in express or implied 
warranties. 
a. Extension of Credit 
With respect to loans, for retail sellers like the interviewees, loans can 
be part of the transaction and either received from the supplier or extended 
to the customer. Concerning loans from suppliers, all the interviewees 
initially reported that they paid cash to their suppliers for all supplies, 
despite the great diversity of inventory and experience. When pressed, two 
said that they sometimes borrowed inventory from their suppliers. Of 
these, one sold produce and repaid the loan out of the proceeds from the 
sale of that inventory, after the market day. The other had a lean-to well-
stocked in dry goods, essentially non-perishables, and apparently repaid 
the supplier-provided loan out of general revenues. Essentially, the 
suppliers had an account receivable from the interviewees, who had an 
account payable to the suppliers. 
Only those two vendors who borrowed in kind were able to draw 
capital from their commercial transactions through the use of trade 
payables. It was only these two who were able to use the commercial 
transactions the way a purchaser with credit can in the Global North. Of 
course, conversely, none of the other vendors owed obligations to their 
suppliers for which legal redress could be required.
62
 
Before considering whether an interviewee as seller would extend 
credit, we will first consider the nature of the customer. The interviewed 
vendors were inevitably sandwiched between their supplier and the 
customer,
63
 and that customer might be intending to resell or might be a 
consumer purchasing for own use. It is hard to distinguish between the two 
because even a relatively modest purchase—four pairs of shoes for 
example—could be for resale. The interviewees surmised that most of 
 
 
 62. More broadly in connection with their business activities, the vendors did have obligations. 
One vendor expressly reported borrowing from a Ngangi, or tontine, volunteering that it was a 
privilege; in other words, there was very high incentive to repay timely. However, this borrowing was 
not directly related to the sales transaction. To further complicate the legal picture, a borrowing from a 
tontine appears not to be a commercial act but, rather, a “civil” act under the civil rather than 
commercial regime. See Anne Marie Fone, née Mdontsa, Le Secteur Informel Camerounais au regard 
du Droit Commercial, in 2 ANNALES DE LA FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES JURIDIQUES ET POLITIQUES 119, 
120–21 (Presses Universitaires d’Afrique 1998) (asserting that tontines are closer to associations, 
which are non-commercial, than to banks, which are commercial). This borrowing thus is not a 
commercial act for purposes of GCL articles 2 and 3. 
 63. This is not surprising, as it is definitionally the case for any retail seller who does not 
manufacture or otherwise produce the inventory.  
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their customers were consumers buying for their own use, but 
conceptually both a customer for resale and a consumer could request an 
extension of credit. 
Considering the relationship between the interviewee as retail seller 
and the seller’s client, the seller might be willing to extend credit in order 
to increase the pool of potential purchasers, or to deepen the relationship 
with a particular customer by using credit to signal trust. Upon initial 
discussion, all sixteen interviewees who responded to the question as to 
whether they ever extended credit said at first that they always demanded 
cash payment from their customers. When pressed, however, all sixteen 
respondents admitted to extending some loans to their customers. 
Three sellers reported protecting themselves by using a layaway 
arrangement: the buyer received the goods only upon full payment, and, as 
one seller noted expressly, even this well-protected credit was extended 
only if the interviewee trusted the buyer. One of these sellers lent for up to 
one month; this interviewee was among the most formally established 
vendors and sold non-perishable goods on the installment plan. Another 
vendor, a tailor, asked for payment before delivery of the completed 
garment, though sometimes extended credit if the customer was trusted. 
Three other interviewees also emphasized that they extended credit only if 
they trusted the customer (one adding that the customer also had to be 
polite). Among the remaining nine interviewees, some would lend for one 
or two days, while others lent until the next market day or even for a week. 
Of all the retail sellers who extended credit, only two claimed to offset 
at times the credit by a slight increase in the price. One seller, who sold 
second-hand goods, said that the goods have no price, and that if the 
vendor thought the item was pretty, the price was higher.
64
 This vendor, 
who had a university degree and was particularly sophisticated and 
articulate, emphasized that the vendor demanded whatever the market 
would bear, and that the concept of separating out an interest component 
to cover the time-value of money and any risk was irrelevant in that 
context. 
In terms of enforcement, not one of the interviewees reported going to 
the formal court if unpaid. When vendors of goods were asked what they 
did when a customer who had borrowed failed to repay, five of the seven 
sellers of perishable goods said that they did nothing. The remaining two 
reported going to the police or to an informal court within the market. 
 
 
 64. « Prix n’est pas fixé à l’avance ; la friperie n’a pas de prix : je paie pas cher, mais je vends 
cher si je trouve joli. » (“The price isn’t fixed in advance [of the potential sale]; second-hand goods 
have no price: I get them cheap, but I sell high if I think them pretty.”). 
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Similarly, seven of the ten sellers of non-perishable goods said that they 
did nothing when a customer defaulted,
65
 while two reported that they 
would go to the police. One of these two noted that this step had been 
required only twice in eight years of operation. A third seller of non-
perishables would go instead to the gendarmerie, a paramilitary 
organization within the Ministry of Defense,
66
 because it was closer to that 
vendor’s business establishment than were the police. Having the police or 
paramilitary act as judge, jury, and sheriff-bailiff is not formal 
enforcement of the formal law; rather, it is an ad hoc reinforcement of a 
basic norm to repay obligations and is highly irregular from a formal-law 
perspective.
67
 
The vendors provided other examples of ex-post resolutions in the 
event of unpaid debt, but these resolutions did not depend on authorities of 
any kind. Two of the seven sellers of non-perishables who said they did 
nothing when a customer defaulted, added that the clients would come 
back and that the vendor would get repayment at that time. One of these 
sellers, a tailor who advanced credit as reluctantly as the rest of the 
vendors, deployed not only the ex-ante tactic of typically holding back the 
goods until fully paid, but also used ex-post self-help. This vendor noted 
that if a client to whom credit had been extended did not pay, the vendor 
would wait until the client returned in search of a new garment, at which 
point the client would “fall into [the seller’s] hands.” In other words, the 
client would then be eager to settle the pre-existing obligation in order to 
obtain the new item. 
These references to returning clients were interesting because the 
vendors tended to say that there were very few repeat-play relationships. 
This was true even for the five vendors who explicitly mentioned “trust” 
as an important factor in any decision to extend credit.
68
 Interestingly, the 
 
 
 65. Seventeen vendors responded to this question, although only sixteen admitted to extending 
credit. 
 66. David K. Chiabi, Cameroon, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2004), available at 
http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/lawenforcement/n416.xml. 
 67. For violations of OHADA law, for example, the OHADA Treaty is clear that the national 
judicial system, up to the level of the Supreme Court, is responsible for settling disputes. See OHADA 
Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 13–14; see generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing, inter alia, the OHADA 
regime). 
 68. The tailor was using market force, of course, but also more generally a relationship with 
clients. The importance of the relationship is central to the other vendors’ reference to trust. The 
literature concerning the impact of interactive relationships touches on the concepts of cooperation and 
the prisoners’ dilemma. Iconic writings in the area include those of Stewart Macaulay and Lisa 
Bernstein. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (discussing businesspeople in apparently iterative relationships, who behave to a 
standard higher than the minimum required by contract law); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
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vendors emphasized not only that they changed suppliers depending on 
availability of goods, but also that they benefited from very little customer 
loyalty. Sellers of second-hand goods were particularly clear that repeat 
business was not part of their experience. Thus, at least as between the 
vendor and customers, the overall reality appears to be that while 
established iterative relationships did exist between interviewees and some 
customers, that kind of repeat relationship was not the norm. If anything, 
the relationship between the interviewees and their suppliers tended to be 
even more arms-length than with customers. Both of these observations 
are consistent with the interviewees’ general reluctance to extend credit, 
and the suppliers’ general refusal to extend it, especially in an environment 
where formal business laws do not provide these business transactions 
with an exoskeleton of predictability and enforcement. 
In summary, very few interviewees—only two of twenty—were able to 
use the transaction with their suppliers to increase capital, because almost 
all suppliers demanded cash payment. On the other side, the interviewees 
struggled to extend their market and reported that, where forced by the 
exigencies of the market to extend credit, they did so reluctantly. Law as 
an enforcement mechanism was not directly mentioned. Indeed, not one 
vendor mentioned going to the formal courts. 
As is clear, the formal business laws that are designed to increase 
businesspeople’s ability to do business effectively and that technically do 
apply to all businesses in Cameroon, whether in the formal or informal 
sector, do not—in practice—apply to the interviewees. Despite the formal 
business laws, the vast majority of interviewees did not find suppliers 
willing to extend credit and they themselves remained reluctant to provide 
credit to their own customers. Unlike a retail seller in the Global North, 
formal business laws neither helped these vendors to draw capital from 
their suppliers through the use of trade payables derived from their 
purchases, nor did it protect the vendors when they extended credit to 
customers as a strategy to increase their markets.  
 
 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) 
(discussing the closed, iterative world of diamond merchants). For application of the concept in the 
context of the informal sector, see Claire Moore Dickerson, OHADA’s Proposed Uniform Act on 
Contract Law, 13 EUR. J. L. REFORM 462, 475 (2011). But see supra note 5 and accompanying text 
(reporting that the vendors in the pilot study, and informal-sector workers in general, typically do not 
have iterative relationships). 
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b. Quality and Warranties 
Even if interviewees did not lend or borrow, they could still have rights 
and obligations legally enforceable under formal law. Even in the absence 
of loans, these vendors have a cause of action against suppliers pursuant to 
the GCL on warranties, and obligations to customers as to the goods’ 
quality. Depending on whether the interviewees sell to resellers or to 
consumers, these obligations are pursuant either to the GCL, or to the 
applicable common law or Civil Code, plus the Cameroon Consumer 
Law.
69
 Not one interviewee described bringing a proceeding against a 
supplier, or being subject to a suit for reasons of inadequate quality. 
Interviewees reported relatively arm’s length relationships with both 
suppliers and customers. The interviewees focused neither on their rights 
against suppliers, nor on their obligations to customers. That silence may 
be at least in part because the products were chiefly clothing and produce, 
and these are susceptible to inspection. The interviewees as buyers, like 
their customers, could inspect before purchasing. Only one vendor sold 
closed containers, such as cans and packages of food. In the case of the 
clothing, some of it was clearly understood to be “seconds,” making 
assertions of inadequate quality difficult in any event. 
In brief, purchasers deep in the informal sector did not appear to make 
use of the rights the formal law provided regarding quality. Similarly, the 
informal-sector entrepreneurs failed, both as buyers and as sellers, to 
extract from formal law the protection of credit that increases credit’s 
availability. 
II. FORMAL TAX LAW AS THE LABORATORY FOR FORMAL BUSINESS 
LAW’S IMPLEMENTATION IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Just as formal business law exists in Cameroon, so does formal tax law. 
At first, the fact of tax collection in the informal sector suggests that 
formal tax law is being enforced there. If that were true, formal tax law 
could offer a template for the introduction of other formal laws into the 
informal sector. It could demonstrate how formal business laws, for 
example, can be introduced into the informal sector to enhance, rather than 
disrupt, the informal-sector entrepreneurs’ contributions to their families 
and the economy. 
 
 
 69. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing quality obligations and warranties under Cameroon’s formal 
law: GCL between economic operators or enterprisers; common law as modified by the Cameroon 
Consumer Law for relationships between economic operators or enterprisers, and consumers). 
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However, formal tax law is not implemented in the informal sector: the 
tax authorities obtain payment from taxpayers that formal tax law does not 
permit.  Taxpayers, too, fail to comply with formal tax law even though 
they do make payments to the government. These payments are not an 
example of voluntary compliance with formal law. Instead, and as is 
further discussed in the next section, culminating in the discussion at Part 
II.B.2, they are the result of an exercise of raw government power made 
easier by the inevitable presence of money in any context concerning 
taxes. 
A. Formal Tax Law Regime and Actual Tax Collection Experienced by the 
Informal Sector: The Signs of Success 
While some taxpayers may fear leaving the informal sector for the 
formal sector because of tax exposure, the reality is that even those deep in 
the informal sector do pay taxes. In fact, as we will see, they may well be 
paying all taxes due, and then some. Taxation is thus a primary location 
for the interaction of informal-sector workers with government and its 
formal laws, and is experienced by all the vendors.
70
 
1. Formal Tax Laws 
Although the amount of vendors’ annual sales is important to 
understanding their tax exposure, we did not ask our interviewees for that 
figure because prior efforts were met with laughter and mistrust. Further, it 
is difficult to assess the accuracy of a vendor’s statement about turnover 
just by looking at the vendor’s establishment. For example, one 
interviewee claimed not to have any permanent location at all, but 
explained that supplies obtained in Cameroon were destined for a store the 
vendor owns in the Republic of Congo. Yet another vendor who sold 
second-hand goods from a lean-to reported supplying purchasers in the 
 
 
 70. See generally INTERNATIONAL FINANCE GROUP, WORLD BANK, DESIGNING A TAX SYSTEM 
FOR MICRO AND SMALL BUSINESSES, GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS (2007), available at 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Designing_Tax_Systems.pdf. There is an argument that 
Cameroon is undertaxed. See, e.g., Benjamin Fomba Kamga & Claude Mvolo Bessala, Taxation of 
Goods and Services of the Informal Sector in Cameroon (Centre for the Study of African Economies 
Annual Conference: Economic Development in Africa, Paper No. 489, 2010), available at 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2010-EDiA/papers/489-FombaKamga.pdf. If that is so, the pilot 
study suggests that the problem of paying less in taxes than legally obliged may be at the higher levels 
of income, and not among the smaller entrepreneurs of the informal sector. 
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entire CEMAC
71
 region. A visual assessment of the interviewee’s 
premises could not help substantiate either claim, although there was no 
basis on which to challenge the assertions either. 
Thus, we cannot know the actual or even alleged revenues of the 
interviewees. On the other hand, Cameroon’s Institute of Statistics reports 
that in the period 2005–10, average and median monthly revenues in urban 
areas, such as where the pilot study’s markets were located, were 70,400 
Central African Francs (FCFA) and 37,700 FCFA, respectively.
72
 For 
Cameroon as a whole, the figures were 39,400 FCFA and 15,000 FCFA.
73
 
Given those figures, average annualized revenues in urban areas were 
roughly 845,000 FCFA and the median revenues in urban areas were 
roughly half that, while across Cameroon the annualized figures were 
473,000 FCFA and 180,000 FCFA, respectively.
74
 
There are four relevant types of income- or sales-related taxes 
potentially applicable to petty traders: income tax, the value added tax,
75
 
the “discharge tax” (impôt libératoire),76 and the “business license” 
(patente).
77
 
 
 
 71. Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC; in English, 
“Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa”), whose members are Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Connaître la CEMAC, 
CEMAC, http://www.cemac.int/apropos (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). 
 72. Roughly USD 140.80 and USD 75.40, respectively. INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA 
STATISTIQUE, DEUXIÈME ENQUÊTE SUR L’EMPLOI ET LE SECTEUR INFORMEL AU CAMEROUN (EESI 2) 
78 (2011) [hereinafter EESI 2], available at http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/downloads/EESI2/ 
Rapport_Principal_de_la_phase_1_EESI_2_du_20_03_2012.pdf at 78. Central African Francs (Franc 
de la Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale) is the currency issued, in this case, by  the Banque 
des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) within the CEMAC countries See Histoire de l'Emission 
Monétaire en Afrique Centrale, BEAC,  https://www.beac.int/index.php/component/content/article/49-
billets-a-pieces/185-histoire-de-lemission-monetaire-en-afrique-centrale (last updated 2011). 
 73. Roughly USD 78.80 and USD 30.00, respectively. EESI2, supra note 72, at 78. See generally 
Fomba Kamga & Bessala, supra note 70, at 7 (the statistics appear to include in revenus the gross 
amount received by independent workers and the salaries of salaried workers, and that is how the 
figures are used here; if that is not correct, then the sales figures for the informal sector must be 
increased using an assumption concerning what percentage of sales is reflected in the revenus.). 
 74. Annualized average income of 845,000 FCFA or 473,000 FCFA in Cameroon would equal 
roughly USD 1700 and USD 950, respectively, for informal-sector workers. That is significantly 
below the per-capita GDP for all Cameroon, estimated in 2010 at USD 2300. CIA, World Factbook, 
Cameroon, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011). On the other hand, households whose primary source of income is an independently 
employed person in the formal sector on average earned FCFA 212,000 (roughly USD 424) monthly, 
or more than twice as much as households where the primary source is in the informal sector, being 
over 2.5 FCFA million per year, or roughly USD 5100. See EESI2, supra note 72, at 59. 
 75. See, e.g., Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § 125.  
 76. See, e.g., id. § C 45. 
 77. See, e.g., id. § C 8 (business license and patente). 
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The most sophisticated tier applicable to small businesses is the basic 
income tax. A taxpayer with annual sales below fifteen million FCFA,
78
 
which likely includes all but one of our vendors,
79
 pays the discharge tax 
instead.
80
 A taxpayer under the latter regime is not subject to the value 
added tax either.
81
 The taxpayer’s remaining major obligation is to obtain 
a business license if that is applicable: as a basic concept, all natural 
persons involved in a business activity
82
 are required to apply for a 
business license.
83
 A person subject to the discharge tax, however, is also 
exempt from the business license,
84
 and the threshold for passage from 
discharge tax to business license is attained when revenues exceed fifteen 
million FCFA.
85
 Thus, any person who has revenues below fifteen million 
FCFA, even if otherwise subject to income tax, need comply only with the 
requirements of the discharge tax.
86
 Because the statistical reports from 
 
 
 78. Roughly USD 30,000. 
 79. This vendor, who sells from a well-appointed, enclosed store within Cameroon’s largest 
market, proudly indicated that the discharge tax is for the petty traders (“les petits,” a term also used to 
describe children, but used here in a condescending way), while the business license, applicable to this 
vendor’s business, was for the big operators (“les grands,” a term that also means adult). 
 80. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § 27(2) (natural persons subject to the discharge tax are 
exempt from income tax), § C.47(12) (a taxpayer subject to the discharge tax becomes subject to the 
business license when sales exceed fifteen million FCFA). The analysis in the rest of this paragraph 
explains why this Article assumes, for purposes of discussion, that the interviewees are subject to 
discharge tax and not even the business license. 
 81. Taxpayers with sales under fifteen million FCFA are also exempt from value added tax. See 
id. § 125(3) (« Les personnes physiques ne sont assujetties [à la Taxe sur la Valeur Ajoutée (TVA)] 
qu’à condition qu’elles réalisent un chiffre d’affaires annuel minimum de 15 millions de francs 
[cfa]. »). Of course, a taxpayer who is also a consumer of an end product pays as part of the purchase 
price any value added tax embedded in that price; however, the value added tax is not applicable to our 
interviewees as commercial operators assumedly with annual sales below fifteen million FCFA. 
 82. Not relevant to our pilot sample, none of whom are juridical persons, the more sophisticated 
accounting requirements apply to the latter as well. Id. § 73(1) (relative to accounting obligations of 
individuals and companies). 
 83. Id. §§ C 8, C 9 (requirement to get a business license, sometimes referred to as a “patente” 
even by Anglophones). Taxpayers with sales in excess of fifteen million FCFA do have to obtain a 
business license, although whatever they have paid towards the discharge tax is credited towards the 
business license. Id. §§ C 47(12) (« Lorsque pour un contribuable soumis à l’Impôt Libératoire, des 
éléments positifs permettent de déterminer un chiffre d’affaires supérieur à 15 millions, . . . »), (13) 
(« Dans ce cas l’Impôt Libératoire acquitté constitue un acompte à valoir sur le principal de la 
contribution des patentes. »). 
 84. Id. § C 11(15) (exclusion for those obligated to obtain a business license; the text, if not the 
spirit, seems to protect also the taxpayer who is obligated to obtain that permit but fails to do so, as it 
excludes “persons liable to the discharge tax,” i.e., “les personnes assujetties à l’impôt libératoire” 
(emphasis added)). 
 85. Id. § C.47 (15) (the business license becomes applicable when there is positive evidence that 
revenues exceed fifteen million FCFA). 
 86. Plus, with respect to income tax, possibly those who have sales of exactly fifteen million 
FCFA. There is a discontinuity at sales of exactly fifteen million FCFA, since General Tax Code 
§ 132(4) stipulates that the more sophisticated “basic [income] taxation system” applies at sales of 
exactly fifteen million FCFA, while sections 61(1) & 132(3) say that this regime applies between 
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Cameroon indicate that most commercial operators are well below the 
fifteen million FCFA threshold, as are the vast majority of our pilot 
sample, the discussion that follows assumes that the discharge tax is 
applicable. 
The discharge tax is fundamentally progressive and based on the 
taxpayer’s profession. The local government (the Council) determines the 
actual amount of tax (from the interviewees’ comments, it is frequently the 
tax collectors who in fact do so) within brackets established by the Code. 
Thus, for example, a hairdresser with up to three employees is in Category 
A and is taxed up to 20,000 FCFA per year.
87
 A seller of beverages is in 
Category C, unless alcohol is included, or unless the trader’s annual 
turnover is between ten million FCFA and fifteen million FCFA, in which 
case the taxpayer is in Category D. The Category C taxpayer is taxed 
between 20,001 FCFA and 40,000 FCFA per annum, while the Category 
D taxpayer is taxed at between 50,001 FCFA and 100,000 FCFA per 
annum.
88
 
In addition to the four basic types of taxes, which are the most 
prominent taxes, there are multiple other taxes and fees. Supplemental to 
the discharge tax or, in some cases, the business license, both of which are 
Council taxes,
89
 Cameroon’s General Tax Code imposes another twenty-
seven taxes, fees or levies, depending on how one counts. They include a 
fee for occupying the public way.
90
 There are also surcharges for “local 
development,”91 levies relating to the possession or slaughter of cattle,92 
and a tax for sanitation.
93
 There are even charges supplemental to the cost 
of the basic ticket, for the privilege of boarding a bus.
94
 
Although there are many Council fees, the ones most relevant to this 
project are those directly applicable to selling in a market.
95
 These fees are 
 
 
(entre) fifteen million and fifty million, suggesting that “entre” includes both fifteen million and fifty 
million. If that is the case, a taxpayer at exactly fifteen million FCFA of revenues would have an 
argument that the ultrasimplified discharge tax (Impôt Libératoire) applies.  
 87. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C 46, roughly USD 40. Also in Category A are “[t]ailors or 
dressmakers with less [sic] than five machines, apprentices or employees, or working alone,” 
providing an incentive to hide sewing machines from the inspectors. 
 88. Id. (roughly USD 40–80 for Category C, and USD 100–200 for Category D; there are many 
more subcategories within each category than those included here). 
 89. They are in the Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, Book Three: Local Fiscal Systems. 
 90. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, §§ C 91–C 93. 
 91. Id. §§ C 57–C 60. 
 92. Id. §§ C 63–C 67. 
 93. Id. § C 77.  
 94. Id. § C 99. 
 95. Id. §§ C 80–C 90. The very next section, § C 91, is related as well, as it covers the 
“temporary occupation fees of the public thoroughfare” (occupation temporaire de la voie publique). 
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essentially a head tax and thus are divided between fixed fees, generally 
applicable to relatively stable traders,
96
 and the daily fees applicable to 
occasional vendors.
97
 The occasional vendors and those without a 
“permanent place in the market” pay a daily fee set by the municipal 
Council within a statutorily mandated range, in this case, between 100 
FCFA and 500 FCFA.
98
 The interviewees with the most impermanent 
locations chiefly described payments of 100 FCFA, although one 
mentioned 200 FCFA and another 500 FCFA.
99
 These head taxes are 
described by our interviewees, both in English and in French, as “tickets,” 
a term the Code also uses but does not define.
100
 
2. Actual Tax Collection 
All these fees, together with the discharge tax, are formal taxes 
enshrined in Cameroon’s General Tax Code,101 and are applicable to our 
interviewees so long as their annual sales are below fifteen million FCFA. 
These are the formal taxes that the sellers must pay, and they report paying 
them. The formal tax system created pursuant to formal law is carefully 
designed to collect even from people primarily in the informal sector. 
Indeed, vendors can hide items of inventory in order to appear to be below 
that fifteen million FCFA threshold, and thus subject to discharge tax 
 
 
 96. Id. §§ C 81–C 83. 
 97. Id. §§ C 84–C 86. 
 98. Id. § C 84(1). Roughly USD 0.20 and USD 1.00, respectively. 
 99. Roughly USD 0.20, USD 0.40, and USD 1.00, respectively. 
 100. Id. § C 86(1). 
 101. Especially in rural areas, there are also informal taxes. The payments in cash or service are 
taxes in the sense that they are organized by public officials, but informal in the sense that they are not 
explicitly authorized or enforced by the government. Instead, local social pressure is applied to force 
conformity. These informal taxes fund, through classic and sweat equity, informal investments in 
infrastructure and other public goods. See Benjamin A. Olken & Monica Singhal, Informal Taxation, 3 
AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 3, 11 (Oct. 2011) (describing, inter alia, an informal tax system, 
especially in rural areas, and rates comparable to subnational units’ formal tax in developed countries). 
The interviewees, who all spoke from non-rural, urban markets, described payments that they made for 
security, for trash pick-up, and for sanitary facilities. Some, especially for the sanitary facilities, 
appeared to be fully entrepreneurial efforts by private parties. Some of the trash pick-up and security 
seem to have been organized at least in part by market officials who were described as having at least a 
semi-official capacity. The definition of “official” is complicated by the role of tribal leaders. See 
AMBE J. NJOH, SELF-HELP WATER SUPPLY IN CAMEROON—LESSONS ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
IN PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS (2003) (describing a water project in Anglophone Cameroon, and 
emphasizing the role of tribal as well as regional governmental officials). This Article discusses the 
private and semi-private payments only to describe failures of the formal system, as the focus of this 
discussion is on the fully formal tax regime enshrined in Cameroon’s General Tax Code. The extent of 
voluntariness of formal and informal tax payments are, of course, closely related. See infra Part III.A 
(discussing tax morale, concerning the voluntariness of formal-tax payments). 
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instead.
102
 The same general strategy applies to efforts to be placed in a 
lower “category” of discharge tax. For example, a tailor could hide sewing 
machines to have fewer than five and thus be in the lowest taxable 
category, “A.”103 One vendor explicitly described hiding much of the tools 
of the trade during the two periods each year when the tax inspectors were 
expected, in order to suggest a more modest operation, but even those 
businesspeople pay some taxes. The smallest traders in the markets 
reported that tax collectors came by regularly to collect the 100 FCFA 
daily fees. 
Whether the vendors represented their tax payments accurately or not, 
many in our small sample apparently believed that they were paying taxes 
that were not in fact owed. As an example, one of the vendors was 
perfectly aware that the tax authorities were not permitted by the code both 
to collect the discharge tax and to require a business license.
104
 This 
vendor, accompanied by others claiming to have been subjected to the 
same unauthorized collection of taxes, brought a complaint to the local 
government, the Council. The taxpayer reported that the entire group was 
unceremoniously ushered out of the building, without having their 
concerns addressed. 
As a general matter, allergy to taxation is a common theme. Only one 
vendor was calm and uncomplaining about taxes, while another paid no 
Cameroonian taxes and claimed not to owe any because allegedly the 
vendor was doing business only in and paying taxes to the Republic of 
Congo. All eighteen of the remaining vendors in our study were very 
precise about their concerns: they bemoaned the lack of transparency as to 
how their exposure was calculated, the tax collectors’ failure to offer 
legally mandated receipts in exchange for payments,
105
 and other 
irregularities including being charged by the government auditors for 
audits, and being compelled to pay bribes.
106
 
 
 
 102. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.15. Note that if sales are to be determined, for example to 
establish the business license, an exemption from that obligation and the application of the discharge 
tax, or the applicability, for example, of the discharge tax’s highest category (category D), and if the 
tax authorities cannot ascertain what are the sales, these are deemed to be ten times the inventory at its 
sales price. Id.  
 103. See supra note 87 (discussing the provision relating to sewing machines). Category A 
includes “[t]ailors or dressmakers with less [sic] than five machines . . . .” Gen. Tax Code, supra note 
20, § C.46(a) (Discharge tax, Category A).  
 104. See supra note 84. 
 105. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, §§ C.47(6), C.128(3) (respectively, the obligation of tax-
authority representatives to issue receipts for the discharge tax, and for Council levies including the 
market tax). 
 106. In the study, two interviewees admitted paying bribes, another said that controllers would 
borrow, yet another reported that the controllers would demand 200 FCFA for having come to do the 
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Another common complaint was the lack of services received in 
exchange for the taxes. The interviewees reported that some of the security 
and even of the trash pick-up were provided through privately organized 
payments to privately contracted workers. It is possible that the taxpayers 
were confused as to whether they were paying a private contractor or the 
Council via a separate fee. As noted above, the sanitation fee, for example, 
is part of the Council’s “local development tax.” 
Indeed, at least some of the complexity and concomitant lack of 
transparency may be due to the many ways that the government interacts 
with business people. The municipal Council plays many roles including 
that of the landlord to some vendors, thus charging rent as well as 
collecting taxes. When the same authority demands payment for two 
purposes, confusion is possible. Conceptually, the government, too, has a 
problem distinguishing the two payments as it is the tax code that forbids 
the Council’s tenants from subleasing the premises, thus conflating rents 
and taxes.
107
 In other words, the tax code discusses rents as well as taxes. 
Under these circumstances, it is easy to see how a vendor could be 
confused as to whether a payment is for tax or for rent; in that case a 
tenant-taxpayer could easily believe that taxes are too high. 
Thus, problems of transparency may be unfair both to the taxpayer and 
to the government. As further described below,
108
 these problems increase 
a taxpayer’s lack of confidence in formal law and in the government, as 
the taxpayers learn to know their government through a morass of 
superimposed fiscal obligations. The problem is compounded in 
Cameroon by the administrative regime, which centralizes collections 
before redistributing them.
109
 This has the effect of diminishing 
accountability by severing the connection between the local government 
and the taxpayers. 
B. Tax Collection Is Deceptive Evidence of Formal Tax Law’s 
Implementation in the Informal Sector 
Based on responses we gleaned from interviewees, it appears at first 
that formal tax law has a direct impact even in the informal sector. Taxes 
mandated by formal law are actually imposed and paid—at least to some 
 
 
mandated “control” (audit), six complained of confusion, and another three said never to argue. Two 
of the vendors showed up in more than one category. 
 107. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C 82(3). See also supra Part I.A.2 (discussing Council, i.e., 
the local government, as landlord). 
 108. See infra Part III.A (discussing, inter alia, tax morale). 
 109. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C 114–C 119. 
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degree. The question is whether the payment and collection of formal 
taxes is in fact due to formal law, and therefore, the extent to which formal 
tax law can be a template to ease other formal laws into the informal 
sector. If formal tax law is effective in the informal sector, the question is 
the extent to which formal business law, for example, can follow the same 
path. 
1. Formal Tax Laws Are Violated Through the Tax Administration’s 
Illegal Behavior, and Tax Workers’ Leakage 
The interviewees did report paying formal taxes, but they also 
demonstrated confusion as to what they were paying for and to whom they 
were ultimately paying. Some interviewees even knowingly made 
payments in excess of those formally required, asserting that the tax 
authorities compelled them to do so. This is inconsistent with behavior 
that would normally result from full implementation of the formal laws.
110
 
Although taxes are paid even by those at the bottom of the economic 
spectrum, the interviewees reported significant failure on the part of the 
government and its tax collecting agents to respect the formal law as 
contained in the Code. We have seen a taxpayer forced to pay both the 
license and the discharge tax, although these are mutually exclusive,
111
 and 
other taxpayers were denied receipts mandated by the formal law. Even in 
these cases, the government’s failure to respect the law was in the context 
of the formal law and due to many causes, including a refusal to recognize 
either that formal law exists, or the substance of that law. The only way to 
know that a taxpayer’s payment was for the business license or for the 
discharge tax was by reference to formal law, even if they were mutually 
exclusive taxes. The only way that the tickets of 100 FCFA were 
generated was by reference to formal law, even if no receipts were 
delivered. Thus, formal tax law does have an impact even in the informal 
sector. 
 
 
 110. Elsewhere, I have argued that formal tax law does penetrate into the informal sector. Claire 
Moore Dickerson, Fairness and Formal Laws in the Informal Sector: The Example of Cameroon, in 
AN EXPLORATION OF FAIRNESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND THE 
HUMANITIES 33, 43, 45 (Janis P. Sarra ed., 2013) (discussing fairness and the exercise of government 
power, including through application of tax laws in the informal sector). The focus there was on the 
impact of the exercise of power. Here we are focusing directly on whether it is the formal law that is at 
the heart of that exercise of power. 
 111. See supra Part II.A.2 (concerning mutually exclusive taxes). See also Gen. Tax Code, supra 
note 20, §  11(15) (stipulating that payment of the discharge tax is an exemption from any obligation to 
obtain a business license). 
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On the other hand, the impact of formal tax law in the informal sector 
is unpredictable because the law is not applied consistently, and thus is not 
the same as full implementation.  Law can of course be flouted in a 
predictable way, but that does not seem to be the case here. Of the 
taxpayers who spoke about receipts, four said they received a receipt for 
each tax payment. However, one received a receipt only “sometimes,” 
another taxpayer never received one, and a third claimed to have received 
a receipt for 10,500 FCFA against a 35,000 FCFA payment.
112
 
Two other indications of unpredictability—in fact of arbitrariness—
concern the actual amounts paid. Two interviewees described tax 
collectors who demanded a supplemental payment because they had to 
come to the taxpayer in person. I found no ground for such a payment in 
the formal law, and the amounts charged were inexplicably different. In 
one case, an interviewee was charged 200 FCFA per collector-visit to an 
enclosed store at the edge of a large, well-established market in Douala, 
the commercial capital; in the other, a different interviewee was charged 
5000 FCFA per visit to a much less permanent outdoor stand from which 
items of apparel were sold in Douala’s largest market.113 Another instance 
of unpredictability concerns the one taxpayer out of the twenty, who 
described being subjected to a mutually exclusive, double tax burden.
114
 
Thus, formal tax law is present to some degree: it informs the 
characterization and some of the amounts of tax. Nevertheless, the myriad 
ways in which the government and its representatives bend or frankly 
contravene the law, present a picture not consistent with fully 
implemented formal law. Similarly, we have seen that at least some 
taxpayers were sufficiently informed of the formal statute to use it as a 
shield by hiding some of the tools of the trade in order to be given a lower 
category of discharge tax.
115
 However, even this behavior is practical 
opportunism rather than the confident application of formal law as 
protection against unauthorized demands for tax payments. Meanwhile, 
others knowledgeable in the law simply recognized that the government 
was compelling payments unauthorized by formal law. Taxes are collected 
in the informal sector, but this is not evidence that the tax authorities have 
implemented formal tax law in the informal sector. 
 
 
 112. Roughly a receipt for USD 21 against a payment of USD 70. 
 113. Approximately USD 0.40 and USD 10.00, respectively. 
 114. See supra Part II.A.2 (interviewee described paying both the discharge tax and the business 
license despite Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.11(15), that makes these mutually exclusive). 
 115. See supra Part II.A (interviewee reporting the hiding of tools of the trade). 
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2. From the Taxpayers’ Perspective: The Money Engine, Not Formal 
Tax Laws, Drives Tax Collection 
Of all twenty interviewees, only one suggested that paying taxes is a 
natural obligation in exchange for services from the government, citing 
trash pickup as an example of a government service. This interviewee, as a 
former civil servant, may have had a relatively good opinion of the 
government, especially as the vendor’s spouse remained in government 
employ. These government posts are very much sought-after.
116
 
In general, not only did the interviewees discuss the tax authorities’ 
failure to act predictably, transparently, or even in compliance with formal 
law, but they also reported a significant awareness of government power. 
Two taxpayers mentioned that the collectors who came to their places of 
business to audit also requested to borrow money—a request the 
interviewees evidently felt unable to refuse. Other evidence of coercion 
included paying taxes without a receipt, although formal law required such 
receipts.
117
 Three interviewees explained that they received no receipts, 
and another claimed to have been handed a receipt for less than a third of 
the actual payment.
118
 The interviewees may be poor, but they have been 
in business a long time; given their long experience, acquiescence to the 
lack of receipt implies some degree of duress. 
In another case an interviewee stated that the tax collectors who had 
come to the store had insisted that the sum they requested be paid or the 
store would be “sealed” (closed).119 A visit to the assessor brought no 
 
 
 116. See Vie Publique¸ L’Etat employeur, VIE PUBLIQUE (May 30, 2006), http://www.vie-
publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/finances-publiques/approfondissements/etat-employeur.html (these 
French government figures report that, in 2000, 15% of people actively employed and 18% of all 
salaried employees were working for the government, whether local or central, whether indirectly 
through a parastatal or directly). Cameroon’s civil service being a successor to the French, pre-colonial 
structure, the prominence of civil service in France is at least an indication of its importance in a 
former colony. The figures for the proportion of the Cameroonian population that is in the civil service 
are notoriously unreliable. See, e.g., Agendia Aloysius, Participating in Positive Change: The 
Cameroon Civil Service and the War of Figures, PARTICIPATING IN POSITIVE CHANGE (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://agendia.jigsy.com/entries/economy/the-cameroon-civil-service-and-the-war-of-figures (discussing 
successive and imprecise government pronouncements about the quantity of so-called ghost workers—
people being paid as civil servants without doing work). 
 117. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, §§ C.25 (license certificate from Chief of Taxation Center, to 
which are annexed “payment receipts”), C.47(6) (“The payment of the discharge tax shall give 
entitlement to the issuance of a tax ticket signed by the taxation service”), C. 86(1) (for, inter alia, 
daily fees: “The shop rents and proceeds from the sale of tickets shall be collected . . . against a receipt 
. . . hearing [sic] a printed facial value equal to a term of the monthly rent or cost of the ticket.”). 
 118. Referenced supra Part II.B.1 (reporting missing receipts, and a receipt for 10,500 FCFA 
against a tax payment of 35,000 FCFA). 
 119. “[S]ealing” is a penalty for non-payment of the business license. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 
20, § C.31(2). It is likely that the interviewees are subject to the discharge tax, not the business license, 
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relief, and the payment had to be made. This interviewee explained that 
the computation of the discharge tax was on capital, referring to the tools 
of the trade, and expressed a preference for revenue-based taxation. In 
fact, for that interviewee’s profession, the formal tax law determined the 
category of discharge tax based on the number of employees, not the 
amount of capital, so neither the tax collectors nor the interviewee 
correctly understood the formal law. After the taxpayer unsuccessfully 
sought relief from the collector-demanded improper tax calculated using 
improper inputs, the taxpayer succumbed to the threat of closure and paid 
the requested amount. Unable to pay both the tax collector and the private 
landlord, the interviewee paid only the first. 
Not all efforts to obtain accountability were unavailing, however. An 
interviewee reported that some years ago, the local Council demanded 
vendors selling particular goods in a market to pay a fee imposed on each 
unit of product rather than the daily fee of 100 FCFA. The Tax Code does 
not provide for imposition based on that unit of product: assuming that 
other criteria are met, a daily fee of between 100 FCFA and 500 FCFA is 
the appropriate measure of tax.
120
 When all the similarly situated vendors 
refused to sell their goods in that market, the local tax authorities 
capitulated after a month. On balance, the cost to the vendors must have 
been deemed too high, as the interviewee indicated no desire to participate 
in such a job action ever again; this is a measure of the taxpayers’ 
perception of government power. 
Interviewees used other ways, too, of responding to government power. 
Two interviewees expressly stated that they bribed tax collectors to reduce 
payments. The group of six other interviewees who, as mentioned above, 
had sought relief from an illegal simultaneous imposition of both the 
business license and a discharge tax, resorted to self-help as well, and 
began to pay bribes after the authorities at the city hall refused their 
request for relief.
121
 
There was even one reported successful attempt to obtain increased 
services from the local government.
122
 A group of fifteen from the same 
 
 
as noted supra Part II.A.1 (discussing application of formal laws). “[T]he automatic and immediate 
closure of the establishment(s)” is a consequence of non-payment of the discharge tax. Gen. Tax Code, 
supra note 20, § C.47(11). 
 120. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing formal tax laws in Cameroon); see also Gen. Tax Code, 
supra note 20, § C.84 (daily fees). 
 121. See supra Part II.B.1; infra Part III.A.2.b (taxpayers without relief when charged for a 
business license and a discharge tax simultaneously). 
 122. This success can increase tax compliance, according to the tax morale literature. See infra 
Part III.A.2.c (discussing the tax morale literature concerning public goods and services). 
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market had gone to city hall to request a service, namely a weekly pick-up 
of trash for which they said they had paid through their taxes,
123
 and 
obtained satisfaction. Arguably, the positive impact of receiving the 
public-goods benefit overcomes the negative of having to fight for what is 
rightfully theirs. On the whole, however, the tax-collection machine uses 
government power as the tool for obtaining tax payments. 
This tax-based money-generating engine has a characteristic that 
encourages its deployment by a government that has an imperfect structure 
and a clear hunger for revenues: it collects its own fuel. Not only does the 
process have the power of the government behind it—a government that 
needs the tax revenues—but the tax collectors, too, as individual 
representatives of the government, operate in an environment where they 
share their employer’s incentive to perform at a high level of efficiency.124 
Indeed, through bribery and failure to issue receipts, the tax collectors can 
divert more money to their own pockets by being arbitrary but effective in 
extracting payments—so long as the government does not catch them and 
punish them. 
There are tax administrators who express a desire to see more rigor.
125
 
According to the interviewees, however, the individual tax-workers 
exercised governmental power to collect more than what formal law 
allows, and to do so with impunity. As three interviewees emphasized, and 
another five hinted through resignation, the taxpayer has no realistic 
opportunity of recourse. When asked how a taxpayer would know how 
much to offer as a bribe, one interviewee replied that there are points of 
reference,
126
 suggesting a norm well embedded in the system. 
 
 
 123. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.57 (“Local development tax” which “shall be collected 
for the basic facilities and services . . . notably . . . sanitation, refuse collection.”). 
 124. This method of creating incentive in the workers is limited neither to government action, nor 
to the Global South. Recovery audit contractors are outsourced auditors for Medicare, who “get no up-
front fees, but instead are paid a percentage of the money they retrieve. They eat what they kill.” See, 
e.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our 
Health Care, TIME MAG. SPECIAL REP., Mar. 4, 2013, at 16, 49 (describing “private ‘recovery audit 
contractors’” as being paid 9–12.5% of the funds they retrieve).  I am not suggesting that these 
recovery audit contractors skim off the top, as the interviewees reported that some tax collectors did, 
but the incentive is there. As described by the interviewees, tax collectors can, and thus have a 
structurally provided incentive to, pocket tax payments by giving incorrectly low receipts or by 
encouraging the taxpayer to offer gifts in exchange for a lower tax payment to the government. In the 
case of the audit contractors, the structural incentives for these auditors and for the Medicare provider 
are to replace the provider’s 100% correction of an error by the provider’s payment to the auditors of 
an amount in excess of 9–12.5% of that amount, but less than the full amount that the provider would 
otherwise have to pay in correction.  
 125. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.2.b (describing a mid-level tax administrator lamenting the general 
laxity). 
 126. In French, “Il y a un barème, mais après ça il faut deviner.” (There is a scale, but after that, 
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This corrosive normality likely exists in part because of governmental 
inability to contain its employees, and in part because skimming by these 
employees is a form of self-help compensation actually useful to the 
government.
127
 The defalcation by the tax collectors is of course a 
violation of formal tax laws, but it is an inherent component of the money 
engine’s power. 
Tax collection is indeed a money engine based on power. The 
government has every incentive to create a formal system that will collect 
taxes in the informal sector. Through the business license, and especially 
the discharge tax and multiple fees, the formal Tax Code does provide for 
payments by people who earn modestly even by local standards. The 
government deploys collectors throughout the informal sector, and the 
interviewees report paying those taxes.
128
  Nevertheless, not only is the 
government not reliably implementing formal tax law,
129
 but the evidence 
suggests that the interviewees do not perceive themselves as stricto sensu 
complying with formal tax law either. From the interviewees’ perspective, 
they must “allow” the government to collect from them payments that, 
while couched as “tax,” are substantively or procedurally inappropriate 
under formal law. Those payments, far from being in compliance with 
formal tax law, are the result of exercise of raw power by the government 
and its agents. 
The money engine effectively removes governmental incentive to 
animate a structure that will encourage systematic respect of formal tax 
laws, even though it has itself made those laws. When the government 
expends funds to allow its collectors to fan out in the population, it is as a 
practical matter also winking at leakage. This is a poor template to 
encourage application of formal tax law, let alone for the introduction of 
other formal laws into the informal sector. 
III. THE LEARNING FROM TAX LAW CONCERNING THE GOVERNMENT’S 
ROLE IN INTRODUCING FORMAL BUSINESS LAW TO THE INFORMAL 
SECTOR 
The interviewees did reflect hostility to the tax regime, with one or two 
exceptions. There is an argument that formal tax laws are favorable to 
 
 
it’s guesswork.) 
 127. Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable Corruption of Transition, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 509, 
526–28 (1999) (describing Hungarian police’s self-help “taxation” through demanding bribes at traffic 
stops). 
 128. See supra Part I.A.1 (“tickets”). 
 129. See supra Part II.B.1 (focusing on the government’s violation of its own laws). 
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business because they generate revenue that enables the government to 
provide an infrastructure that supports business. The pro-business 
infrastructure includes the roads and security whose lack the interviewees 
bemoaned, as well as other services that may offer a more indirect support 
to business, such as medical care, water, and the like.
130
 
With regard to formal business laws, organizations such as the World 
Bank consider them to be pro-business if fully implemented and thus to be 
essential to development.
131
 While the interviewees were not directly 
asked their opinion about the formal business laws, they demonstrated 
more ignorance and skepticism about than enthusiasm for these laws. All 
but one had failed to comply with the formal laws’ registration 
requirement applicable to all economic operators, some explicitly 
questioning the benefit.
132
 
Assuming that formal business laws are pro-business, they should be 
available in the informal, as well as formal sectors. When considering how 
to accomplish this goal, we have already seen that formal tax law is not 
respected by either the government or the informal sector taxpayers. 
Hence, it is an anti-template for introducing other formal laws, such as 
business laws, into the informal sector. Now we turn to the positive 
lessons the formal tax law can teach about introducing formal business 
laws into the informal sector. 
A. The Tax Model: How to Obtain Compliance with Formal Tax Laws in 
the Informal Sector 
1. Literature: Tax Morale and Compliance 
Part II has emphasized a significant failure of compliance with formal 
tax laws in the informal sector in general, and by the group of interviewees 
in particular. Nevertheless, the surprising reality about formal tax laws 
outside this sector is that most taxpayers, even when not being watched, 
 
 
 130. See infra Part III.A.2.c (discussing public goods and services experienced by the 
interviewees). 
 131. See generally World Bank’s “Doing Business Reports”, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING 
BUSINESS IN OHADA 2012, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/regional-reports/ohada; 
see also WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012, supra note 19 (discussing various regulations affecting 
businesses, including analyzing the OHADA business laws, and reporting that in the prior six years all 
OHADA member countries had increased the ease of doing business). 
 132. See supra Part I.B.1–2 (discussing, respectively, the obligation to register under the GCL, 
and the fact that all but one of the twenty interviewees had failed to do so); see also GCL, supra note 
29, arts. 35 (formerly art. 19), 13–14 (substantially unchanged). 
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do, in fact, comply with tax laws.
133
 The utility-based literature on 
compliance cannot explain this outcome. This literature’s perspective, 
even on basic concepts such as the impact on compliance of audit 
probability and of fines, is insufficient to explain the actual rate of 
taxpayer compliance. Intuition about utility and deterrence does suggest 
that as the audit probability or fines increase, tax evasion decreases.
134
 As 
noted below, however, empirical research reveals a level of compliance 
even higher than would be expected from a pure deterrence model. After 
explaining this outcome in, for example, the Global North’s formal sector, 
the focus turns to implementing the same outcome in the Global South’s 
informal sector. 
Utility analysis predicts that an increase in tax rate, even assuming that 
audit probability and frequency of fines remain constant, will increase the 
value to the taxpayer of tax evasion. Thus, when the amount of tax is 
greater, so is the value of the benefit from not paying the tax. This, in turn, 
should increase non-compliance as the tax rate rises. In a progressive-tax 
environment where higher rates generally apply to people with higher 
income, and thus assumedly to richer taxpayers, the utility theory explains 
the inverse relationship between tax rates and the level of compliance. It 
does so by suggesting that wealthier persons are more risk-seeking than 
poorer ones. Nevertheless, even if the empirical results generally support 
the prediction that richer taxpayers evade more, the results are mixed as 
some studies show higher-rate taxpayers evading less.
135
 This latter result 
can be explained in part because, instead of seeing the increased value of 
evasion, a taxpayer at a higher rate may feel less wealthy and thus more 
risk-averse, thus reducing the likelihood of tax evasion.
136
 Persons who see 
themselves as less rich, whether because they are relatively poor or 
because they feel impoverished by a higher tax rate, are more risk-averse 
and thus are less likely to evade taxes.
137
 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Sanjit Dhami & Ali Al-Nowaihi, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Tax Evasion: 
Expected Utility Versus Prospect Theory, 75 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 313, 314 (2010) (finding that 
taxpayer behavior is better explained by prospect theory than by expected utility theory). 
 134. Erich Kirchler, Stephen Muehlbacher, Barbara Kastlunger & Ingrid Wahl, Why Pay Taxes? A 
Review of Tax Compliance Decisions, in DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLAINING 
TAX COMPLIANCE 15, 20–24 (James Alm et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Kirchler et al., Why Pay?] 
(analyzing audit probability and fines). See also KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, 
at 168 (importance of audits and fines to obtain compliance from “rational, utility-maximizing 
taxpayers”). 
 135. Kircher et al., Why Pay?, supra note 134, at 18–19 (tax rate). 
 136. Id. at 19 (tax rate & income level). 
 137. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. 
PUB. ECON. 323, 329 (1972) (a classic study of the effects of income levels on compliance); Kirchler et 
al., Why Pay?, supra note 134, at 16–18 (discussing the impact of income level); but see KIRCHLER, 
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Whether the observed outcome is that the absolutely more wealthy 
evade more or that they evade less, the explanation in both cases is that 
persons who perceive themselves as wealthy are risk-seeking and tend to 
evade taxes. In contrast, those who do not see themselves as wealthy are 
relatively risk-averse.  However, even this basic premise is itself the object 
of conflicting studies. Some of the unexpectedly high levels of non-
compliance may well have been due to considerations not fully accounted 
for, such as the multiple reasons for differing risk profiles, including the 
fact that certain higher-income taxpayers may have more ways of hiding 
income.
138
 Most important, utility theory has not explained the mixed 
empirical results and has had difficulty predicting both the direction and 
extent of tax compliance.
139
 
The concept of tax morale seeks to address the excess compliance that 
classical utility theory has not explained adequately.
140
 The fundamental 
intuition behind the tax-morale concept is the Kahneman and Tversky 
prospect theory, which asserts that losses are more salient than gains.
141
 
Credit card companies requested that retailers offer cash discounts rather 
than impose card-use surcharges. Because customers viewed the “loss” in 
paying a surcharge as more salient than the avoided “gain” inherent in 
foregoing a discount, they were more willing to use credit cards when 
forgoing a discount rather than paying a surcharge.
142
  
In the tax context, the usual discussion is in terms of risk aversion: a 
person (here, a taxpayer) will seek relatively more risk to avoid a potential 
 
 
ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 24 (reporting more compliance from higher-income 
taxpayers). 
 138. Kirchler et al., Why Pay?, supra note 134, at 17–18 (concerning levels of income). 
 139. Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT’L TAX 
J. 345, 347 (1985) (noting that economic rationality does not explain the relatively high compliance 
rates). See generally Simon James & Clinton Alley, Tax Compliance, Self-Assessment and Tax 
Administration, 2 J. FIN. & MGMT. IN PUB. SERVICES 27 (2002) (noting, contrary to the assumptions of 
economic rationality, that it is not the case that most taxpayers evade taxes); KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 26; Kirchler et al., Why Pay?, supra note 134, at 16–24 (concerning 
the effects of income level, tax rate, audit probability, and fines). See also Dhami & al-Nowaihi, supra 
note 133, at 175 (2007) (noting that the predictions of expected utility theory do not conform with 
observations even if the stigma of discovered tax evasion is included). 
 140. For an accessible and sophisticated introduction to tax morale, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A 
Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 603 
(2007) (recommending strategies to the U.S. Treasury Department). 
 141. Id. at 609 (referring to the prospect theory as a means of enhancing tax morale). Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 
454 (1981) (summarizing studies); KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 139 
(summarizing studies tying prospect theory to taxation). See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  
 142. Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions, supra note 141, at 456. 
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loss than to obtain a potential gain.
143
 Assuming that paying a tax is a loss, 
it will be relatively salient. In addition, a risk-seeking taxpayer (a person 
who feels richer) is more likely to evade taxes than is the rational homo 
economicus, and a risk-avoiding taxpayer (one who feels poorer) is 
similarly more likely to pay taxes than a narrowly rational counterpart.
144
 
This analysis offers tax authorities strategies to obtain compliance at a 
higher level than utility theory predicts. One approach would be for the 
government to avoid encouraging taxpayers to feel rich and about to 
sustain, through taxation, a loss.  Withholding tax is a partial solution: it 
leads to relatively high compliance at least in part because instrumentally 
the taxpayer cannot avoid the withholding payment, and thus, the loss part 
of the equation is moot.
145
 In addition, a taxpayer perceives over-
withholding as a benefit—indeed, as a gain in the form of a refund. That 
perception persists even though a refund is merely a return of the 
taxpayer’s own money: the taxpayer sees a windfall and thus is less 
reluctant to submit to the tax than if the taxpayer had to make a new 
payment.
146
 
However, there is more to tax morale than the prospect theory. Here, 
the analysis moves not only beyond utility’s neo-classical economic 
approach and cognitive psychology, into the realm of social influence and 
culture.
147
 This even thicker explanation focuses on the forms of social 
influence and applies a concept of reciprocity in two ways. First, there is 
reciprocity based on perceptions of compliance: whether the taxpayer sees 
other taxpayers meeting their obligations.
148
 Second is a type of reciprocity 
 
 
 143. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 141, at 273, 277–80 (analyzing the 
impact of risk, focusing on perceived change in value—gain or loss).  
 144. See, e.g., James & Alley, supra note 139; KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 
10, at 26. This prospect theory is closely related to another concept from cognitive psychology, the 
endowment theory, which focuses on the higher value that a person attributes to an object owned as 
distinguished from the same object not yet obtained. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. 
Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 
(1991) (discussing the endowment theory). See also John Cullis, Philip Jones & Alan Lewis, Tax 
Compliance: Social Norms, Culture, and Endogeneity, in DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS, 
supra note 134, at 35, 37–38 (discussing newer explanations for tax compliance and categorizing them 
as “‘tinkering’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘social’”, and placing prospect theory in the “cognitive” category). 
 145. See, e.g., James Alm, Tax Compliance and Administration, in HANDBOOK ON TAXATION 741 
(W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999) (noting that the effectiveness of “[s]ource 
withholding has been universally found to increase tax compliance.”).  
 146. KIRCHLER, ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 10, at 135–36 (refund potentially framed as 
a gain).  
 147. Cullis et al., supra note 144, at 38 (discussing the “social” category). 
 148. Id. at 38–39 (discussing social influence in the context of tax compliance). See also Kent W. 
Smith & Loretta J. Stalans, Encouraging Tax Compliance with Positive Incentives: A Conceptual 
Framework and Research Directions, 13 L. & POL’Y 35, 40–41 (1991) (discussing the positive effects 
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manifested by the tax authorities when they treat the taxpayers with 
respect. This version of reciprocity is focused more on taxpayers being 
heard,
149
 although compliance-watching reciprocity and respect are closely 
allied.
150
 
Reciprocity is a complex concept that suggests that the overall climate 
of compliance or lack thereof is relevant to individual taxpayers’ levels of 
compliance. The version of reciprocity that is compliance-watching 
reciprocity occurs among taxpayers. Empirical evidence reveals that 
taxpayers who see others complying with formal law are more likely to 
comply, whether because of a specific sense of fairness to the community, 
or a more generalized sense of fairness towards society at large.
151
 Evasion 
follows the same pattern: if some taxpayers perceptibly evade, other 
taxpayers will tend to do so as well, with a strong push towards benefiting 
themselves whatever the social consequences.
152
 Overall, taxpayers prefer 
not to be the sole chump who is paying taxes when non-paying free riders 
enjoy the same resultant services.
153
 
Admittedly, this kind of compliance-watching reciprocity is negative: a 
taxpayer evades because others are evading.  Further, it is more salient 
than the positive reciprocity of complying because others are 
complying.
154
 Nevertheless, classic positive reinforcement from the tax 
authorities, too, does encourage compliance. A crude rewards system such 
as a specific reward for a specific compliant behavior may, however, be 
counterproductive. The quid-pro-quo reward may instead only raise the 
taxpayers’ suspicions and will in any event require expensive monitoring 
to ensure that the desired behavior has occurred.
155
 Further, to the extent 
that the taxpayer has internal motivation to pay, that motivation may be 
crowded out by the outside motivation.
156
 
 
 
of reciprocity, including references to tit-for-tat studies, such as that of Robert M. Axelrod). 
 149. Smith & Stalans, supra note 148, at 45–46 (focusing on respect). 
 150. Id. at 43, 45–46 (conflating “respectful” and “responsive”). 
 151. Jan Schnellenbach, Vertical and Horizontal Reciprocity in a Theory of Taxpayer 
Compliance, in DEVELOPING ALTERNATE FRAMEWORKS, supra note 134 at 56, 58–61 (discussing 
reciprocity).  
 152. Id. at 59 (noting “that reciprocity and a concern for equality” are not the same). 
 153. Cullis et al., supra note 144, at 39 (discussing tax morale decreasing when taxpayers perceive 
non-compliance). 
 154. Gary Charness & Martin Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. 
J. ECON. 817, 841–47 (2002) (stating that reciprocity is an important variable, but with negative 
reciprocity having a greater impact than positive reciprocity). 
 155. Smith & Stalans, supra note 148, at 38 (noting that positive effects of tying approved 
behavior to reward may not be more persuasive than classic deterrence and are as costly in 
monitoring).  
 156. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 589, 593–95 
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Conversely, if, for example, the tax authorities are more subtle and 
reward by generating positive feelings through respectful treatment of 
taxpayers, the need to monitor in order to reward each specific compliant 
behavior disappears, and there is evidence that taxpayers become more 
compliant.
157
 The goal of the government when seeking to harness the 
power of respectful reciprocity is to have the taxpayers believe that they 
have a positive, iterative relationship with the tax authorities.
158
 
Relatedly, if taxpayers see their taxes generate public goods and 
services,
159
 they may be more willing to comply voluntarily.
160
 True, 
individuals’ contribution to obtaining public goods and services creates an 
opportunity for free riding.
161
 Nevertheless, individuals may voluntarily 
pay taxes if they (a) value public goods and services, (b) determine that 
their taxes will provide such goods and services, and (c) believe that their 
efforts will encourage others to contribute to public goods and services—
even when there is zero possibility that the tax authorities will detect 
evasion.
162
 Something more than mere altruism appears to be at work here 
because taxpayers displayed increased compliance if their taxes were spent 
to provide public goods or services sourced locally or regionally, 
 
 
(2001) (discussing extrinsic motivation crowding out intrinsic motivation). 
 157. Smith & Stalans, supra note 148, at 39–40, 45–46 (discussing “peripheral cues,” including 
respectful treatment of taxpayers, as a method of influence, and reciprocity). See also Lars P. Feld & 
Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance As the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives 
and Responsive Regulation, 29 L & POL’Y 102, 106–07, 115 (2007) (discussing the tax authorities’ 
respectful behavior towards taxpayers as a form of reward). 
 158. Smith & Stalans, supra note 148, at 42 (discussing a sense of “allegiance” with the 
authorities).  
 159. While the phrase “public good” is sometimes used, the principle appears to reach beyond the 
classic public good. In his seminal article, Paul Samuelson explicitly discussed classic public goods. 
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954). 
Others, however, who cite to Samuelson refer more broadly to, for example, “government services” or 
“a return . . . (or a public good),” suggesting application of a more capacious concept. See James M. 
Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes?, 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21, 
23 (1992) (citing Samuelson). See also Feld & Frey, supra note 157, at 111 (listing “public goods” 
along with government services and government-provided infrastructure, as though the latter two were 
not public goods). “[A] public good . . . is one that is non-excludable (no one can be excluded from the 
good’s consumption) and non-rivalrous (the good’s consumption does not reduce its availability to 
others).” Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 673 (2012); see also id. at 682 (stating “international trade law . . . has public 
good attributes”).  
 160. See, e.g., Feld & Frey, supra note 157, at 104 (describing experiments). 
 161. Id. at 105 (noting aversion to paying taxes for public goods and services because of the 
“incentives to free ride”); James M. Alm et al., supra note 159, at 23 (referring to the incentive to free 
ride). 
 162. James M. Alm et al., supra note 159, at 23–24 (describing private provision of public goods 
and services, as applied to voluntary tax payments for public goods and services). 
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suggesting some relatively direct benefit to those taxpayers.
163
 Because 
there does seem to be some opportunity for positive reinforcement, the 
appropriate government strategy is to communicate effectively to its 
taxpayers that all will receive more of the public goods and services they 
prefer if they comply with the formal tax laws.
164
 
To summarize, the literature suggests that taxpayers comply more than 
would a purely rational, utility-seeking person. More specifically, the tax-
morale literature shows that the self-perceived poor are less likely to evade 
taxes, and that the prospect theory recommends over-withholding. It also 
shows that, pursuant to the cognitive perspective, the following encourage 
compliance: watching other taxpayers comply, tax authorities’ respectful 
relationship with taxpayers, and perceiving the availability of desired 
public goods and services as a result of taxes paid—but not a promise of 
more crudely quid-pro-quo rewards. Withholding is less likely to be a 
fruitful approach as it is tied to income taxes, which are not relevant to this 
Article, and the government will have little control over how relatively 
rich or poor a taxpayer feels.
165
 Two of the three cognitive perspectives, in 
contrast, do lend themselves to government influence: respectful 
reciprocity and communication about public goods and services are much 
more susceptible to direct government action than is compliance-watching 
reciprocity because this last directly concerns the various taxpayers. 
2. Reality: Tax Morale Is Not a Significant Driver of Taxpayer 
Informal-Sector Compliance 
As we saw in Part II.A describing formal tax law and the actual tax-
collection process, the interviewees are not taxed through withholding, let 
alone over-withholding. Instead, as Part II.B notes, the taxpayers succumb 
to the tax authorities’ strategy based on straight enforcement. This money-
engine strategy is shaped by the financial needs of the tax authorities and 
their workers, without full compliance with formal tax law. To the extent 
 
 
 163. Feld & Frey, supra note 157, at 114 (describing a positive relationship between regional/local 
public goods and services, and voluntary tax compliance); but see Piers Fleming & Daniel John Zizzo, 
Social Desirability, Approval and Public Good Contribution, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 258, 262 (2011) (asserting that the level of compliance driven by availability of public 
goods will depend on the degree of the taxpayers’ social desirability personality). 
 164. Alm et al., Why Do People Pay?, supra note 161, at 34, 36 (based on experiments, positing 
increased compliance if the taxpayers expect in return more of the public goods and services they 
prefer). 
 165. Except to the extent that a taxpayer suddenly relieved of an obligation to pay taxes may feel 
richer—and thus even more willing to take tax-avoidance risks—while a taxpayer forced to shoulder a 
new or at least more credible tax burden may feel poorer, and thus more willing to comply. 
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that the taxpayers were complying with formal tax law, they were doing so 
even though the indicia of tax morale appeared absent. Utility theory, in 
the form of seeking to avoid punishment that the government imposes to 
deter non-compliance, will thus continue to explain the existing, limited 
compliance. The taxpayer at minimum will consider the probability of 
getting caught and investigated, and will be influenced by the likely 
consequences, including penalties.
166
 In other words, we are essentially 
looking at the direct effects of the government’s direct power to constrain. 
Recollect that the three remaining compliance-enhancing strategies 
recommended by the literature in social psychology are compliance-
watching (already identified in the previous subpart as the least susceptible 
to governmental influence), respectful reciprocity, and the provision of 
public goods and services. Here we will consider the extent to which they 
are deployed even against an otherwise unfavorable backdrop of tax-
authority non-compliance with formal law. These three strategies depend 
on the taxpayers’ perceptions, and in particular their perceptions of other 
taxpayers’ compliance, the quality of the relationship with the tax 
authorities, and the presence or absence of public goods and services. 
a. Compliance-Watching: How Taxpayers Perceive the 
Compliance of Others 
When questioning the interviewees, we did not explicitly ask them 
about their perception of others’ compliance with the formal tax 
obligations. First, focusing on this issue would not necessarily provide 
much opportunity to propose new governmental intervention; second, 
various means of evasion in any event appeared to be public knowledge. 
One interviewee was responding to questions with another person from the 
same market sitting nearby, and when the first talked about tax payments 
and how a bribe was paid to reduce the tax payment, the other person 
laughed and confirmed a similar experience. Another interviewee 
mentioned that a half-dozen had gone to the city hall to complain that 
controllers were demanding taxes that were not legally due; having 
received no relief, they now just pay bribes. Yet another mentioned 
matter-of-factly that during the two months when the controllers were 
expected, the interviewee hid some capital assets in order to maintain a 
lower category of discharge tax and thus reduce tax payments.
167
 
 
 
 166. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 137 (discussing the basic utility theory of 
deterrence). 
 167. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.46 (creating the categories); see generally supra Part 
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In assessing how normal the taxpayers perceive tax evasion, the issue 
of the interviewees’ understanding of their payments is relevant. As we 
have seen in Part II.A.2 describing how taxes were in fact collected from 
the participants, taxpayers did appear to confuse other payment 
obligations, including rent owed to the Council, with tax obligations. 
Obviously, it is hard to determine taxpayer perceptions of the rate of 
others’ actual tax compliance if these perceptions are based on non-tax as 
well as tax payments. From the perspective of assessing the impact of the 
perceptions, however, errors in understanding the nature of the payment 
may not be fatal. If an interviewee sees a neighbor failing to make what 
the interviewee believes to be a required tax payment, tax morale and in 
particular cognitive psychology suggest that this observation of non-
compliance will serve to validate the interviewee’s own tax evasion even 
if the observed non-payment actually is of rent and not tax.
168
 
Given this learning, the government can seek to increase the likelihood 
of tax compliance by causing more taxpayers to comply, so that more 
taxpayers would see other taxpayers complying. Besides assuming the 
conclusion, this analysis provides no guidance because we have already 
seen that pure brute force will not succeed. However, other measures 
might contribute to a tax-compliance outcome. 
b. Respectful Reciprocity: Tax Authorities’ Relationship with 
Taxpayers 
The interviewees’ comments indicate a perception that the taxing 
authority and their representatives are disrespectful and arbitrary. When a 
half-dozen vendors complained at the city hall that collectors were 
imposing on them both for a business license and the discharge tax, which 
these vendors knew to be mutually exclusive,
169
 they reported being 
unceremoniously tossed out. A couple of other interviewees noted that the 
controllers who came to assess taxes also demanded that the interviewees 
lend them money, and another two reported that the controllers charged 
extra to come to the location to collect, with no explanation other than that 
leaving the office generated a charge. Yet another seller said that 
representatives of the local government collected 200 FCFA every day, 
 
 
II.A.2. 
 168. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing cognitive psychology as a basis for a broad conception of 
tax morale, and its focus on observed behavior). 
 169. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.11(15) (exempt from the business license are “persons 
liable to the discharge tax”). See generally supra Part II.A.1. 
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that no receipt was offered, and that the interviewee did not know what the 
payment was for; in fact, the tax code authorizes a daily fee of between 
100 FCFA and 500 FCFA, the exact amount to be determined by the local 
government.
170
 To summarize the reported experience with receipts, three 
interviewees expressly mentioned a lack of receipts, and two others, 
grossly incorrect receipts, the most egregious example being a receipt of 
10,500 FCFA against a 35,000 FCFA payment.
171
 
There are also indications that the communications from and between 
the tax authorities and taxpayers fail to consider the taxpayers’ needs, a 
form of disrespectful failure to listen.
172
 Interviewees do not describe 
having received from the tax authorities a clear understanding of what are 
their obligations. As evidence, they frequently conflated the business 
license and discharge tax: virtually everything other than the daily fees 
was described as a business license, or patente in French, even when the 
amounts described were below the business-license threshold.
173
 One 
interviewee, when pressed to explain a particular apparently illegally 
demanded tax payment, simply noted that it is not wise to get into 
disagreements with the authorities.
174
 
Communication from the tax authorities to taxpayers was thus at best 
negligent, and at worst contemptuous and systematically incorrect. This is 
not designed to generate a perception of respectful reciprocity. All is not 
unrelievedly dark, however. The interviewees at the two businesses that 
appeared to be the best established ran their commerce from enclosed 
shops and appeared to have a relatively high-quality level of inventory. 
These vendors also were the most matter-of-fact about their tax 
obligations, were among the most knowledgeable of formal tax law, and 
 
 
 170. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.84 (costing 100–500 FCFA daily fees for occasional 
vendors); see generally supra Part II.A.1 (discussing formal tax law). 
 171. Roughly USD 21 and USD 70, respectively. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 172. See Smith & Stalans, supra note 148, at 45–46 (referring to respect as being respectful and 
responsive listening). 
 173. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.47(12) (the taxpayer is subject to business license and not 
discharge tax when revenues exceed fifteen million FCFA). In the context of a 1000 FCFA monthly 
payment for market maintenance that the tax collector apparently demanded, the interviewee reported 
not knowing the basis for the amount. The formal General Tax Code sections C.57 & C.58 do provide 
for a Council-level tax for market maintenance. However, in order for that obligation to reach 12,000 
FCFA per annum, the underlying discharge tax would have to be between 60,001 and 100,000 FCFA 
per annum, which in turn puts the taxpayer into Category D of the discharge tax, meaning a turnover 
of at least 10 million FCFA per annum. Id. §§ C.58, C.46. Interviewee was one of the most 
knowledgeable and said the rent was FCFA 20,000 per month, i.e., 240,000 FCFA per year; while 
more successful than many traders, it seems unlikely that this vendor from an open stand generated ten 
million FCFA per year, let alone the fifteen million FCFA which is the threshold for the business tax. 
 174. The comment in French: “Il ne faut pas s’entre-déranger avec les autorités,” said by the 
interviewee compelled to pay both the business license and the discharge tax.  
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expressed no animus towards the taxing authorities. In the course of my 
conversations with legal professionals, I also spoke with a well-placed 
person in the tax authority who emphasized the need for rigor throughout 
the entire system of tax administration. Nevertheless, the systematic 
respect for taxpayers that enhances tax compliance according to tax 
morale’s cognitive psychology literature175 was not much in evidence. 
Since government-to-taxpayer communication is at the heart of 
respectful reciprocity, it is worth noting that some of the more general 
expressions of strained relationships between the interviewees and the 
government may well be based on non-tax issues. One vendor recalled a 
rumor that the Council intended to raze the entire market to put up new 
shops, and asked only for transparency, to be told in advance and in detail 
what the Council’s plans entailed. More directly related to taxes and as 
noted above,
176
 the interviewees did not always know whether a particular 
payment to the local government was for rent or for taxes. This 
complicates an assessment of the relationship between taxpayers and the 
tax-collecting government. The previous subpart emphasizes, however, 
that a payment perceived to be tax compliant will have the effect of 
perceived tax compliance for purposes of tax morale. Similarly, so long as 
the interviewees put the various payments to government in a single 
mental pot, the tax-morale literature suggests that taxpayers will make tax 
payments more voluntarily and at a higher rate if the government has 
treated them with respect as regards any obligation the taxpayers perceive 
to be a tax obligation. In the case of the interviewees, the concept applies 
to rent paid to the Council just as much as to actual tax payments, 
especially if the taxpayers experience both payments as tax. 
c. Public Goods and Services: Communication About Their 
Presence or Absence 
Tax-morale literature also suggests that tax compliance will tend to 
increase when the government provides the public goods and services that 
taxpayers desire.
177
 In brief, the interviewees’ comments suggest that they 
perceived an uneven return on their tax investment. Only eight of the 
twenty interviewees answered the question asking them to identify the 
support the government had provided; for seven the answer was a null set, 
 
 
 175. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the tax morale literature). 
 176. Part II.A.2 (describing actual tax collection). 
 177. Id. (discussing the tax morale literature); see also supra note 159 (discussing the definition of 
public goods). 
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and the eighth surmised that the government used taxes only to pay its 
workers, including the collectors.
178
 On the other hand, specific questions 
concerning utilities generated compliments from the two vendors in the 
smaller of the two Douala markets, concerning the security that the 
Council appeared to provide. The other vendors expressed frustration at 
the lack of services. Three of the five in the larger Douala market 
complained explicitly about lack of security for themselves and their 
goods. All the vendors said that they had to buy their own water, and most 
of the vendors had to use public toilets that appeared to be run by private 
parties who charged by the use and allowed the toilets to become dirty. 
When asked about other services they received, the vendors were 
uniform in their opinion that no medical services or childcare was 
available other than as offered by private parties. As a practical matter, 
women often had small children around them as they sold, but in at least 
one market the private childcare provider took children as young as two 
weeks. Again, this was privately organized. 
If the interviewees thus perceived their government, including in 
particular the local government, to be providing very limited benefits, their 
description of what additional help the government could offer focused on 
support to grow their businesses.
179
 Nine of the twenty interviewees would 
have liked to see government make capital available to them at reasonable 
cost and of those, two were also looking, one each, for better security and 
better maintenance of the markets. Along with those two concerned about 
the quality of the market’s environment, four others deplored the general 
condition of the markets, focusing on the roads and drainage. One market 
seemed particularly bad because water was apparently rushing into and 
through the market-area during the rainy season. 
Actual premises, as distinguished from the overall ambiance of the 
market, were another topic of complaint. Two vendors thought that the 
government should help locate enclosed shops and nighttime storage 
facilities. According to the interviewees, a shop vacancy became known 
by accident; there was no general posting. The storage issue was one 
shared by all the vendors who did not have enclosed shops. Every night, 
they took everything down and, typically, stored the inventory in a space 
 
 
 178. The spouse of the civil servant allowed as how, even though the government did not help the 
vendor directly, the spouse’s governmental salary was an indirect benefit. 
 179. But see SIMEON DJANKOV, A RESPONSE TO “IS DOING BUSINESS DAMAGING BUSINESS” (2008) 
(arguing that businesspeople do not necessarily know what is the best business environment), 
available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/Response_to_Arrunada_JCE.pdf. 
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rented to them, for a separate fee, by neighboring enclosed shops. Every 
morning, they put everything back up. 
Finally, of the twenty interviewees, three had no answer at all when 
asked what additional services the government could provide. These three 
had also failed to respond to the earlier question concerning what the 
government was in fact providing them. Thus in the main the interviewees 
were unsure how their taxes were spent for public goods and services, and 
some were even unable to articulate, or perhaps to imagine, how 
government could support them other than by easing access to capital. 
The interviewees’ perception of little return on their tax investment 
may be in part because losses, perceived or real, are more salient than 
gains,
180
 where tax payments are losses and benefits received are gains. As 
the tax morale literature maintains, the perception of benefit for taxes is 
crucial to taxpayers’ voluntary compliance with tax laws.181 
Part of the problem may have been communication. Five vendors 
interacted with the local Council not just as taxpayers but also as 
tenants.
182
 This is again the problem of identifying what is a true tax 
payment, and when the government is acting as landlord instead of tax 
collector. Nevertheless, at times it seemed that the government did not 
receive credit for benefits that it did offer. Even those who rented from the 
Council did not mention that rents were below market, as they almost 
certainly were, given that the market enabled tenants to sublet for a higher 
rent than the rent they paid to the Council.
183
 No interviewee mentioned 
this government-provided gift, although it would support an entrepreneur’s 
ability to do business. Instead, when the vendors were asked about their 
perception of government, they described a tax collector rather than a 
supplier of capital or a purveyor of public goods and services. Here, the 
government could increase tax morale by effective communication of the 
services it does provide with its tax revenues. 
 
 
 180. Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions, supra note 141 (summarizing studies). See 
generally Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 141. 
 181. The Kahneman & Tversky prospect theory is included within tax morale. See, e.g., 
Kornhauser, supra note 140, at 601–02, 609 (including the prospect theory and more generally 
summarizing tax morale). 
 182. Twelve rented from private individuals; of the remaining three, one had no fixed place of 
business in Cameroon, and the other two were unclear as to whether they rented from the Council or a 
private person. The rental arrangements are the subject of a separate study; although the boundaries are 
difficulty to maintain, for the current Article the focus is on the sales transactions and consequences 
directly related to them. 
 183. This gift from the Council to local businesses is demonstrated by lessees’ subsequent 
sublease of Council-provided spaces at substantially higher prices, although any sublet is strictly 
forbidden by state law. Gen. Tax Code, supra note 20, § C.82(3). 
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In summary, there is little evidence of tax morale that would encourage 
the interviewees to pay their taxes. They were not confronted by others 
systematically complying with formal tax law and thus could not engage 
in monitoring compliance. There was little respectful reciprocity as the tax 
authorities’ relationship to taxpayers was seen as distant and imperious. 
The government was ineffective in counteracting the interviewees’ 
perception that their taxes generated few public goods or services. Where 
tax morale is absent, it is not surprising that the tax authorities resort to 
coercion, as was described in Part II.B.2’s discussion of the money engine. 
B. Translating Tax Morale to Other Formal Laws: The Role of 
Government 
The tax-morale literature teaches us that there are motivations more 
effective than pure deterrence and more effective than the government-run 
money engine. Applying the analysis of tax morale to the business context 
should be easy, as obtaining support for the business laws would seem 
simpler and more direct than for tax laws. After all, businesspeople may 
well be more favorably disposed to business laws than to tax laws, as the 
former are supposed to benefit businesspeople, not extract property from 
them, as tax law does.
184
 
Businesspeople’s possible greater hostility to tax laws than to business 
laws is a small part of the difference between these regimes. More 
fundamentally, the relationship between citizen and government presents 
differently in tax as opposed to business. The tax picture pits the taxpayer 
against the government even where the taxpayer is aware of fellow 
taxpayers’ conduct. In contrast, the business picture pits the interviewee 
against the supplier or the customer, with the government providing, or 
not, a backdrop of business laws that, if present, encourages performance 
under the contract. While the government is inevitably directly involved in 
taxation, that is not the case for contractual obligations. 
Consider how this difference plays out in the monitoring portion of tax 
morale’s reciprocity criterion. Obtaining compliance through perceptions 
that others comply is in some ways roughly similar in the tax and business 
contexts. In tax, watching others comply reduces embarrassment from 
compliance: it allows the taxpayer to comply without feeling foolish to do 
so.
185
 Applied to business laws, watching another comply could create 
 
 
 184. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 141, at 273, 277–80 (in the context of 
prospect theory, discussing perceived change in value—gain or loss). 
 185. See supra Parts III.A.1 & III.A.2.a (concerning the compliance-watching part of reciprocity). 
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influence for cooperation and reduce the impetus to defect.
186
 Thus, with 
regard to formal laws of both the tax and business varieties, the 
interviewee will be more likely to comply if others do. In the tax context, 
however, the commercial actor’s cooperation is with the government in the 
form of tax compliance, while in the case of business law the cooperation 
is among counterparties, where a norm of compliance would increase the 
likelihood that the interviewee’s counterparty would respond to the social 
influence and comply as well. 
Concerning respectful reciprocity in the tax context, a taxpayer will be 
more likely to comply with formal tax laws if the government’s tax 
authorities listen and otherwise evidence respect.
187
 In the context of 
business laws, this kind of reciprocity is again a form of cooperation, but it 
again applies between contracting parties, not with the government. It 
includes all of the literature on extra-legal constraints made relevant by the 
interviewees’ references to trust, and the five interviewees’ express 
statements that they extended credit only if they trusted the customer.
188
 
To emphasize: in the business context, the relationship is between the 
contracting parties with the government’s role very much in the 
background. 
In the context of public goods and services, tax morale claims that to 
increase the interviewees’ compliance qua taxpayers, they must be able to 
look to government for infrastructure in exchange for their payments of 
tax.
189
 For users of business laws, infrastructure is important, but most 
critically in the form of a reliable, transparent, and fair judicial system 
capable of deciding disputes and enforcing awards.
190
 Such a government 
institution provides a framework within which the extra-legal constraints 
can operate more predictably, an observation that applies with equal force 
 
 
 186. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 173–74 (1984) 
(discussing cooperation in multi-party arrangements of indefinite duration).  
 187. See supra Parts III.A.1 & III.A.2.b (concerning the respect part of reciprocity). 
 188. See supra Part I.B.2.a (discussing three of the interviewees’ willingness to extend credit 
explicitly dependent on trust). See generally Macaulay, supra note 68, and Bernstein, supra note 68. 
 189. See supra Parts III.A.1 & III.A.2.c (concerning the taxpayer’s increased likelihood of 
compliance and the government’s provision of public goods and services). 
 190. There is a difference between Macaulay’s example of businesspeople who make 
arrangements amongst themselves when a formal contract law is an existing and meaningful backdrop, 
and businesspeople who have only extra-legal constraints with no meaningful formal law as a safety 
net. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 27 (1981) (“[T]he social landscape is covered by layers and centers of 
indigenous law.”); Macaulay, supra note 68, at 64 (“Sellers who do not satisfy their customers become 
the subject of discussion . . . at country clubs or social gatherings where members of top management 
meet.”), as quoted in Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 739, 741 n.3, 744 n.14 (2012). 
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to the enhancement of cooperation under the two forms of reciprocity 
(compliance watching and respectful reciprocity). 
For a business lawyer, this discussion has now come full circle. The 
business literature has been discussing extra-legal constraints since at least 
the early 1960s,
191
 and prospect theory since the early-mid 1980s.
192
 
Applying the tax morale literature to formal business law thus is an 
argument on an already well-worn path.
193
 What this tax morale discussion 
highlights, however, is that even if the ingredients for tax morale existed 
in the informal sector, the aspects of tax morale that encourage rather than 
coerce compliance may have analogues in the business-law context, but do 
not translate directly. In the business context, government cannot mimic 
tax morale: government cannot encourage contracting parties’ desire to 
comply by merely relating directly with contracting parties in a fair and 
respectful manner, and by supplying classic infrastructure. Thus 
conceptually, formal tax law is not a good template for business law’s 
introduction into the informal sector. 
Worse, formal tax law’s penetration into that sector is not through tax 
morale in any event.
194
 First, tax laws are not being introduced in a 
meaningful way as government is not actually enforcing the formal laws 
predictably; it merely is collecting taxes.
195
 Second, the government’s 
efforts to introduce the effects of formal law are based on taxation’s 
unique access to cash and are inherently coercive. Thus, they are both 
inapplicable to business law and undesirable as corrosive of tax morale. 
Third, even if tax law’s penetration into the informal sector were 
occurring, and even if the method of introducing tax law were not 
corrosive, whatever incentives exist with respect to tax collection, the self-
fueling aspect in particular,
196
 do not apply to business law anyway. I 
acknowledge that, if formal business laws really would help development, 
they would be a source of increased revenues for the government: more 
businesses would mean at minimum more fees and discharge taxes or 
 
 
 191. See Macaulay, supra note 68. 
 192. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and 
Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1088 n.39 (1983) (citing to Tversky & Kahneman on prospect 
theory); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 64–66 (1986) (referring to the prospect theory). 
 193. The earliest tax article found that explicitly used prospect theory in its argument is from 
1987. Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual 
Framework with Implications for Research, 21 L. & SOC’Y REV. 639, 646 (1987) (discussing the 
prospect theory). 
 194. Parts II.B.2 & III.A.2 (discussing the use of coercion, not tax morale, for tax collections). 
 195. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 196. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the money engine). 
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business licenses, and, if the businesses became successful, eventually 
more income and value added taxes.
197
 Ultimately, however, the 
effectiveness of the business laws and this increase in revenues would 
depend on many factors, including in particular on government 
expenditures to reinforce the judicial system’s regime for deciding cases, 
and for executing on judgments, swiftly and reliably.
198
 Here, the 
infrastructure is a judicial system, not roads, and this judicial system is 
itself the public good that, in the business context, must be in place in 
order to enhance respectful reciprocity; plus, if this abstract infrastructure 
is effective, it may be a particularly salient example of direct government 
involvement that does lead, ultimately, to compliance watching. While the 
government can build roads with taxes collected as they are paid, a judicial 
infrastructure is the condition precedent to predictable application of 
business laws. Thus, for formal business laws to apply effectively in the 
informal sector, the government must spend before it sees resultant 
increases in revenues. 
To have the formal business laws apply in the informal sector, the 
government is more likely to resort to naked coercion, perhaps only in a 
relatively passive manner by, for example, withdrawing from unregistered 
economic operators whatever judicial support already exists.
199
 More 
actively, the government could impose fines on entrepreneurs, even those 
in the informal sector, for failure to conform to formal business laws. The 
first option could reduce governmental expenses, and the second would 
give the advantage to the government of generating fees, assuming that the 
informal-sector entrepreneurs have the means to pay the fines. In effect, 
this kind of deterrence is at least as much an effort to coerce the informal-
 
 
 197. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing Cameroon’s Tax Code). 
 198. See Dickerson, Entrepreneurs, supra note 14, at 189 (discussing the importance of 
enforcement). OHADA, for example, provides formal laws focused on enforcement exist. See, e.g., 
Acte Uniforme portant Organisation des Procédures Simplifées de Recouvrement et des Voies 
d’Exécution, supra note 29. Actual adjudication and enforcement, however, are not adequately swift or 
predictable. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012, supra note 19, at 86 (Cameroon is ranked 
174 of 183 for enforcing contracts). 
 199. Qualification-to-do-business laws of states in the United States also “punish” corporations 
not formed in the state who do business but fail to qualify. See, e.g., NY BUS. CORP. LAW § 1312 
(McKinney 2003) (specifying that a corporation that should qualify to do business in New York but 
has not done so cannot institute or maintain a suit in New York until qualified). The GCL already 
removes from an unregistered economic operator the special conditions available to a registered 
economic operator. See generally GCL, supra note 29, art. 60. One specific example is the briefer, 
five-year statute of limitations. Id. arts. 16 (formerly art. 18), 33 (discussing the statute of limitations 
for economic operators and enterprisers, respectively). See also AKUÉTÉ PEDRO SANTOS & JEAN 
YADO TOÉ, OHADA: DROIT COMMERCIAL GÉNÉRAL 131–132, § 122 (2002) (discussing generally the 
effects of an economic operator’s failure to register; analysis is under the pre-revision GCL, but there 
is no reason for the outcome to have changed). 
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sector entrepreneurs into the formal sector as it is to bring formal laws to 
the informal sector. 
C. Lessons for Government, from Formal Tax Law, for Formal Business 
Law in the Informal Sector 
First, the government could instead consider what aspects of its formal 
tax-collection system are inconsistent with tax-morale recommendations 
and could work to remedy them. They could then analyze how these 
remedial methods can translate to other formal laws. In the tax context, the 
compliance-watching part of reciprocity is the least susceptible to 
immediate government action and, in an environment where non-
compliance is deeply embedded in the norms, may have to wait for the rest 
of the tax-collection regime to catch up.
200
 
On the other hand, the government could take affirmative steps to 
improve its relationship with the taxpaying public, which includes the 
interviewees and similar informal-sector entrepreneurs.
201
 Expenses will 
be involved, including monitoring the collectors, providing reliable 
systems of redress and even raising the collectors’ salaries in order to 
modify their own calculation of risk in connection with defalcation; 
however, these steps are in government control. This respectful reciprocity 
aspect is at least in part a communications issue: government agents 
should be trained to be respectful of taxpayers. 
The government could also be more effective communicating the 
public goods and services it provides based on tax and other revenues.
202
 
While the country certainly needs more roads, clean water, and myriad 
other infrastructural services, the interviewees’ apparent lack of 
understanding as to the local government’s positive role presents an 
opportunity for communication.
203
 The government should continue to 
strive to do more, but it should also make sure that taxpayers understand 
what it is in fact already providing. 
The latter two conceptual approaches, respectful reciprocity and 
provision of public goods and services, do not translate directly from the 
experience of formal tax law to formal business law, as explained in the 
prior subpart. The role of government is too different. Nevertheless, tax 
morale concepts can help bring formal business law to the informal sector, 
 
 
 200. See supra Part III.A.2.a (compliance watching). 
 201. See supra Part III.A.2.b (relational reciprocity). 
 202. See supra Part III.A.2.c (public goods and services). 
 203. Id. (discussing below-market rents in the context of public goods and services). 
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even though respectful reciprocity in the business context is between the 
counterparties, and even though complete overhaul of the national judicial 
system, the immediately relevant infrastructure required by business laws, 
is a very expensive condition precedent to truly reliable application of 
formal business laws in the informal sector. Despite these obstacles, the 
government can model the tax-morale approach through smaller steps that 
nonetheless enhance the likelihood of cooperation among counterparties 
and ultimately of reliable enforcement of formal laws. 
As mentioned, the first step is communication, to signal respectful 
reciprocity. Not communication in the form of vacuous public relations, 
but serious communication of options currently available to the informal-
sector entrepreneurs. 
This same communication can inform the informal-sector 
entrepreneurs of actions that the government is taking to build the 
infrastructure that formal business laws need in order to be effective, 
namely a judicial system that reliably protects these entrepreneurs’ 
commercial rights. Even though the government cannot credibly point to 
measurable improvements in the full judicial system,
204
 and even though 
enforcement of formal laws is difficult and is expensive in time and 
treasure,
205
 there already exist clear and accessible business laws such as 
the OHADA laws, which are themselves at least the beginnings of an 
infrastructure. 
With a relatively small outlay of funds, the government could also take 
steps that would demonstrate provision of public goods and services in the 
context of business laws without engaging the full expense of reforming 
the entire judicial system. There is evidence of significant oversupply of 
lawyers.
206
 Specially trained paralegals and underutilized law graduates, 
preferably supervised by local bar associations, too, can provide both 
services and information.
207
 Given the surplus of lawyers in Cameroon,
208
 
 
 
 204. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2011 154 (no improvement in enforcement of contracts 
2009–2010), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2011/; 
WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2012, supra note 19, at 86 (Cameroon is ranked 174 of 183 for 
enforcing contracts, and was not found to have engaged in reforms through June 2011 that improved 
that performance). 
 205. Litigants and their attorneys report having to go to court multiple times because, upon arrival 
on the appointed date, the judge is absent. 
 206. See, e.g., U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE 
POOR, 2 MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE 29 (2008) (discussing oversupply of lawyers, not all 
of whom, of course, will be either competent or honest), available at http://www.undp.org/content/ 
undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/Lep/making-the-law-work-for-everyone---vol-i---
english.html. 
 207. Id. at 23–40 (discussing use of underutilized members of the bar, as well as specially trained 
paralegals and law students). In my experience with local bar associations, setting up workshops 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] FORMAL BUSINESS LAWS IN CAMEROON’S INFORMAL SECTOR 319 
 
 
 
 
the local government could, for example, make available a space within 
the markets, and the bar associations could dispense legal advice on 
location. The bar could do so through full-fledged lawyers or through so-
called “pupil” lawyers, that is, law graduates who, in preparation for 
taking the bar, work under the supervision of a member of the bar. The 
interviewees demonstrated that taxes are their salient interface with 
government (when asked about business they spoke about taxes); properly 
supervised pupil lawyers would be an additional and non-tax interface. 
This point of exchange between the government and the informal-sector 
entrepreneurs satisfies the direct tax-morale objective of showing what 
public goods and services the government is making available, while 
applying the tax-morale concept to improving the legal infrastructure 
generally. The use of the non-tax interface thus is enlisting tax morale to 
reinforce the reliable application of formal business laws. 
The steps that the government takes towards tax morale’s respectful 
reciprocity, and the development of and communication about 
infrastructure improvements, even if both do not immediately result in the 
compliance-watching form of reciprocity, are positive in themselves. They 
are also consistent with efforts to bring formal business laws into the 
informal sector. The government will ultimately have to provide the fully 
transparent, reliable, and timely enforcement that formal business laws 
need in order to be effective. However, the initial steps towards tax morale 
can be merely to include demonstrable first steps towards providing legal 
support for commercial rights, accompanied by effective communication 
about formal laws. Those first efforts at formal business laws’ 
implementation are the beginnings of respectful reciprocity and provision 
of public goods and services in a business context. As norms start to shift 
from perceiving the government as an adversary to seeing it as a support 
for business, compliance-watching will neatly translate from the tax arena 
to the business arena, to reinforce a norm of compliance. 
 
 
together with the University of Buea in the Anglophone region of Cameroon during the fall of 2005, 
these associations are remarkably active within their communities. 
 208. A Cameroonian lawyer in November 2005 estimated that there were 1500 lawyers in 
Cameroon to serve 16 million people, and that only 20% of these lawyers could earn their living by 
exercising their profession. Interview in Douala, Cameroon (Nov. 7, 2005). In 2005, that was a 
roughly accurate estimate of Cameroon’s population given information publicly available at that time. 
The population in 2005 actually was closer to 17.4 million, but the results of the 2005 census, the first 
since 1987, were not made public until 2010. See, e.g., BUREAU CENTRAL DES RECENSEMENTS ET DES 
ETUDES DE POPULATION, RAPPORT DE PRÉSENTATION DES RÉSULTATS DÉFINITIFS (Apr. 22, 2010) 
(discussing the results of the 2005 census at the moment of the report’s publication in 2010), available 
at http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/downloads/Rapport_de_presentation_3_RGPH.pdf.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article started with the assumption that forcing informal-sector 
entrepreneurs from the environment in which they are functioning 
effectively into the formal sector is counterproductive, especially 
considering both the fragility of many informal-sector businesses, and the 
importance of these businesses to the overall success of developing 
economies.
209
 An alternate option, advanced in this Article, proposes 
bringing formal business laws to the informal-sector entrepreneurs. 
The experience of formal tax laws suggests useful strategies for 
bringing other formal laws into the informal sector, although there are two 
principal ways in which formal tax laws are not implemented effectively 
in Cameroon’s informal sector. First, the interviewees’ experience in the 
Cameroon markets show that formal tax laws are neither enforced by the 
government nor respected by the taxpayers. Second, the tax authorities are 
not taking the pro-tax-morale steps of enhancing the likelihood of 
compliance; instead, the collection regime depends on a self-fueled money 
engine—a pyramid structure backed by coercion. Finally, even if formal 
tax laws were applied consistently in the informal sector, the tax-morale 
strategies to enhance compliance translate with difficulty to the business 
arena because the role of government is much less direct in the business 
context. 
Nevertheless, the government, together with local bar associations, 
could start unveiling the twin tax-morale strategies of respectful 
reciprocity, and provision of public goods and services. The strategy 
would involve deploying legal professionals within the informal sector to 
begin communicating relevant information about the formal legal regime 
applicable to business, while taking the first steps to implement those laws 
in the informal sector, through those same professionals. This process 
carries the formal business laws to the informal-sector entrepreneurs rather 
than the reverse. It is consistent with a do-no-harm approach that improves 
the informal-sector entrepreneurs’ environment without disrupting their 
ability to sustain themselves and to contribute to the entire national 
economy.  
 
 
 209. See supra Introduction. 
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